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THE EARNED RELEASE REVOLUTION:
EARLY ASSESSMENTS
AND STATE-LEVEL STRATEGIES
JESSE J. NORRIS*
Reacting to widespread budget crises, many states are experimenting
with earned release (also known as “early release”) legislation to help cut
correctional costs. This earned release revolution is a stark reversal of
earlier trends toward determinate sentencing. Implementing earned
release policies appropriately could help bring about a new sentencing era
characterized by lower rates of incarceration and higher levels of public
safety. However, earned release is potentially vulnerable to abuse and
prone to backlash, and must be planned and implemented carefully to
avoid endangering the public, fostering injustice, or failing to realize
hoped-for budgetary savings.
This Article outlines a set of principles for ensuring the success of
earned release, using Wisconsin as a case study because of its unusually
complex array of earned release policies over the last decade. After a
preliminary evaluation of Wisconsin’s recent earned release policies, this
Article presents four principles for an effective earned release system.
Specifically, state policymakers dealing with earned release legislation
should (a) prevent injustice by monitoring for bias and requiring
structured, recorded decision-making; (b) provide for effective
implementation through strategic governance; (c) ensure earned release is
compatible with public safety; and (d) complement earned release with
other measures designed to decrease incarceration.
This Article also uses preliminary data to respond to recent work on
earned release and sentence modification. First, in response to arguments
for the superiority of judicial rather than administrative sentence
modification, the Article provides evidence that judicial sentence
modification mechanisms may widen racial disparities.
Second,
* Ph.D. in Sociology, University of Wisconsin-Madison; J.D., University of Wisconsin
Law School. Dr. Norris was a visiting assistant professor of sociology at Beloit College for
the 2010–2011 academic year, and is currently a staff attorney for the Dane County Circuit
Court. He would like to thank Walter Dickey and Cecelia Klingele for their valuable
comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
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addressing the concern that administratively-run earned release might
exacerbate racial disparities, I show that this has not occurred in
Wisconsin. Finally, I demonstrate that Wisconsin’s expanded earned
release programs, in their first full year of implementation, only released
about 100 inmates who would not have been released that year anyway
(about .5% of the state’s prison population). While this does not prove
that earned release can never be a major factor in reducing prison
populations, it does reinforce the Article’s argument for supplementing
earned release with other incarceration-lowering policies.
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I. INTRODUCTION
1

Earned release is on the rise nationwide. In response to historic
budget shortfalls in the wake of the financial crisis, numerous states
expanded opportunities for offenders to leave prison before their
2
maximum release dates, and many more are considering such plans.
This earned release revolution is encouraging because it is a move
toward a criminal justice system that achieves public safety without
relying on unnecessarily high incarceration rates. After all, the United
States has had the highest incarceration rate in the world since 2002,

1. Earned release, as this Article employs the term, refers to any policy allowing
offenders to be released from a confinement or community supervision sentence earlier than
the maximum term originally imposed by the court. The more common term “early release”
is misleading because it suggests that offenders are released before they served the sentence
intended by the judge. This misunderstanding can unnecessarily prejudice the public against
earned release. Accordingly, some scholars avoid using the term “early release,” because
“[l]etting offenders out after the minimum term that the judge said was appropriate is not an
‘early’ release—it is a release before the maximum.” Todd R. Clear & Dennis Schrantz,
Strategies for Reducing Prison Populations, 91 PRISON J. 138S, 147S–48S (2011). Given these
concerns, this Article employs the term “earned release.” Referring to the release as
“earned” is appropriate because authorities tend to permit release before the maximum only
for inmates with good records of behavior or success in rehabilitative programs. The only
exception is compassionate release, in which the inmate is released not because of anything
he or she has done but because of his or her advanced age or “extraordinary health
condition.” See WIS. STAT. § 302.113(9g) (2009–2010) (stating that certain inmates serving
bifurcated sentences may request a sentence modification if they have terminal illness).
However, since candidates for compassionate release will have normally served several years
of prison already, and have effectively lived out the last several years of their active lives in
prison, one could say that they have served enough of their sentence to have “earned” the
right to a more dignified death (or in the case of advanced age, a more dignified final phase of
life).
2. Angela Couloumbis, Rendell Signs Bills on Early Prison Release, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Sept. 26, 2008, at B5 (discussing passage into law of legislation creating compassionate
release, and a type of sentence allowing for earned release after completing certain programs
and engaging in good behavior); Monica Davey, Safety Is Issue as Budget Cuts Free Prisoners,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2010, at A1 (“[A]bout half the states . . . have tinkered with parole, early
release programs and sentencing laws or are considering doing so.”); Gary Emerling, D.C.
Aims to Save Money by Releasing Inmates: Up to 80 Percent Could Qualify to Leave Prison
Early, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2009, at A1 (discussing mayor’s plan for earned release policy
allowing as much as 80% of Washington, D.C.’s inmates to achieve earned release); John Hill,
Fewer Behind Bars: Prison ‘Good Behavior’ Incentive Works, PROVIDENCE J., Dec. 12, 2009,
at A1 (discussing new sentence credit policy expanding the amount of credit inmates can earn
for good behavior); SB 500 a Step in Prison Reform, SEACOAST ONLINE (Feb. 28, 2010),
http://www.seacoastonline.com/articles/20100228-OPINION-2280313
(discussing
New
Hampshire proposed legislation requiring release of inmates with good behavior after serving
their minimum sentence).
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many times the rate of any other democratic, industrialized country.3
Yet these new earned release policies have already sparked a political
backlash in some states, in a few cases resulting in their cancellation or
4
Despite these problems, today’s budgetary realities,
suspension.
together with a widespread shift away from tough-on-crime policies,
suggest that earned release could continue to spread.
This raises a vital question for state policymakers: how can the state
plan and implement earned release in a way that results in significant
cost savings without harming public safety or causing other problems?
This question is exceedingly important, not only because it affects public
safety, but also because the way it is answered will affect the trajectory
of criminal justice reform across the country. Besides increasing risks to
the public, poorly implemented earned release policies could foster
injustice, widen racial and geographic sentencing disparities, weaken
confidence in the criminal justice system, and lead to confusion and
5
frustration among inmates and criminal justice actors. Such outcomes
could cause a backlash that stalls or reverses the process of criminal

3. Sara Wakefield, Invisible Inequality, Million Dollar Blocks, and Extra-Legal
Punishment: A Review of Recent Contributions to Mass Incarceration Scholarship, 12
PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 209, 209 (2010). As of 2007, 756 of every 100,000 people in the United
States were incarcerated. ROY WALMSLEY, WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST 1, 3 tbl.2
(8th ed. 2009). Among Canada, Australia, and the major countries of Northern and Western
Europe, the incarceration rate per 100,000 ranges from 63 (in Denmark) to 153 (in the United
Kingdom). Id. at 3–5 tbls.2–5. Particular populations are incarcerated at considerably higher
rates. For example, the U.S. African-American male incarceration rate is 4,749 per 100,000,
six times the rate for white males. HEATHER C. WEST, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
PRISON INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2009—STATISTICAL TABLES 1, 21 tbl.18 (2010).
4. John O’Connor, Illinois Ends Secret Prison-Release Plan, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 15,
2009, http://www.seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2010638353_apusprisonssecret
release.html (describing an unpublicized process of earned release that gave inmates “good
time” credit before they had earned it, resulting in some offenders being released after less
than two weeks of confinement); Release of Inmates to Stop; Lawmakers Must Find Funds,
KY. POST, Feb. 1, 2003, at 1K; see also supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text (noting the
recent backlash and reform that took place in Wisconsin). For a discussion disputing many of
the claims made by critics of the Illinois early release program, including the claim that the
releases were secret or endangered the public, see MALCOLM C. YOUNG, BLUHM LEGAL
CLINIC NORTHWESTERN UNIV. SCHOOL OF LAW, SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT: THE
TRUTH ABOUT “EARLY RELEASE” FROM ILLINOIS PRISONS 16–17 (2010), available at
http://blogs.chicagotribune.com/files/setting-the-record-straight.pdf.
5. See infra III.A.1. and III.B.1.
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justice reform, leaving the country mired semi-permanently in the
6
incarceration-focused, “tough-on-crime” paradigm of the 1990s.
This Article answers the question posed above by analyzing the
earned release mechanisms of a single state, Wisconsin, and drawing on
its lessons, as well as scholarly sources, to formulate tentative general
principles for successful earned release policies. Wisconsin is a fitting
case study because of its recent experience with several distinct
sentencing regimes, and the unusually large number of earned release
mechanisms that have been in effect at some point over the last decade.
Recent earned release reforms have been the subject of relatively
little research. Since legislation expanding earned release has not
become popular until recently, few empirical analyses of these policies
7
Professor Cecelia Klingele advocates for judicial sentence
exist.
modification as a potentially more transparent, sustainable, and
8
accountability-enhancing form of earned release. In another article,
Professor Klingele analyzes the “early demise of early release” in some
9
states and articulates three principles to guide earned release policies.
This Article, while in broad agreement with Professor Klingele’s
analysis in her latter article, develops a complementary approach
10
Professor Kelly Hannah-Moffat’s
focusing on different issues.
forthcoming article analyzes the use of risk assessment tools in general
6. See Sheila R. Rule, Prisons, Crime and Budgets: Time for a New Paradigm,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 10, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sheila-r-rule/prisonscrime-and-budgets_b_834079.html.
7. See Clear & Schrantz, supra note 1, at 138S (“Although there has been a great deal of
policy activity trying to reduce the size of prison populations, especially in the last few years,
very little of this activity has received rigorous evaluation.”). Most of the existing academic
literature analyzes relatively narrow issues, such as current proposals for “second-look”
judicial earned release and compassionate release. See, e.g., William W. Berry III,
Extraordinary and Compelling: A Re-Examination of the Justifications for Compassionate
Release, 68 MD. L. REV. 850 (2009) (discussing rationale for compassionate release and
evaluating when compassionate release is proper); Richard F. Frase, Second Look Provisions
in the Proposed Model Penal Code Revisions, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 194, 194–202 (2009).
8. Cecelia Klingele, Changing the Sentence Without Hiding the Truth: Judicial Sentence
Modification as a Promising Method of Early Release, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 465, 514–20
(2010) [hereinafter Klingele, Changing the Sentence].
9. Cecelia Klingele, The Early Demise of Early Release, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 415 (2012)
[hereinafter Klingele, Early Demise].
10. For example, Klingele discusses the need to acknowledge limits to institutional
capacity, present the case for earned release in moral terms (rather than selling it as a
budgetary fix), and to further develop the principles underlying earned release. Without
disputing these principles, this Article offers a more “instrumental” (as Professor Klingele
puts it) approach to guiding earned release policy. Id. at 450–58.
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and contends that their use may help achieve lower prison populations,
presumably by facilitating earned release when the risk for recidivism is
11
low.
Professor Bernard Harcourt, responding to Hannah-Moffat,
contends that policymakers should focus on reducing prison admission
12
rather than increasing earned release. His argument is based on the
prediction that risk assessment tools used to inform earned release
decisions will be biased against minorities, and on empirical research
showing that prison admissions, and not sentence length, were the real
13
driver behind increasing prison populations.
This Article makes four contributions to the literature on earned
release. First, in response to Professor Klingele’s argument for
increasing the role of judges in earned release, I argue that
administrators should hold most of the responsibility for earned release
decisions. As part of this argument, I present preliminary empirical data
demonstrating extreme geographical disparities in one of Wisconsin’s
judicial earned release mechanisms, which may have contributed to
14
Wisconsin’s already abysmal racial disparities in imprisonment.
Second, to address Professor Harcourt’s concerns, I use recent data
to demonstrate that the implementation of the earned release
mechanisms in effect from 2009, which was administered chiefly by state
15
officials with the aid of risk assessment tools, was not racially skewed.
However, these earned release programs accounted for only about 5%

11. Kelly Hannah-Moffat, Actuarial Sentencing: An “Unsettled” Proposition
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 3, 4, 10, 30).
12. Bernard Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race, 11 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y
(forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 2, 9).
13. Id.
14. As of 2002, Wisconsin incarcerated a higher percentage of its African-American
population than any other state, according to statistics produced by the federal government.
Black Incarceration Here Highest in U.S., CAP. TIMES (Madison, Wis.), Apr. 11, 2002, at 4A.
Wisconsin is also among the five states with the highest ratio between African-American and
white imprisonment rates. MARC MAUER & RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT,
UNEVEN JUSTICE: STATE RATES OF INCARCERATION BY RACE AND ETHNICITY 10 tbl.5
(2007), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/Admin\Documents\publications\Crd_
stateratesofincbyraceandethnicity.pdf. Moreover, Wisconsin has the nation’s highest racial
disparity for drug crime sentences. Crocker Stephenson, State Leads in Prison Drug Gap,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 6, 2008, at A1. See COMM’N ON REDUCING RACIAL
DISPARITIES IN THE WIS. JUSTICE SYSTEM, FINAL REPORT (2008), available at
ftp://doaftp04.doa.state.wi.us/doadocs/web.pdf, for a discussion on ways to reduce Wisconsin’s
racial disparity in the criminal justice system.
15. See infra note 250–253.
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of the releases that occurred during their existence, and most of the
16
releases only reduced the inmate’s prison sentence by a year or less.
Only 107 inmates released through an earned release mechanism in 2010
(corresponding to about 0.5% of the state’s prison population) would
17
not have been released that year anyway. These results support this
Article’s argument that, because earned release may, in many cases,
have a relatively small impact on incarceration, states need to
complement earned release with other policies reducing prison
admissions.
The third and most general contribution of this Article is that it
analyzes earned release policy in a uniquely comprehensive way,
18
outlining basic principles for prudent and effective implementation.
Finally, this Article’s discussion of the Wisconsin reforms is the first
detailed evaluation of a state’s recent earned release legislation since the
beginning of the earned release revolution.
Part II provides background on national trends in sentencing reform,
including the recent spread of earned release legislation; briefly
overviews Wisconsin’s five sentencing eras; and outlines the current
earned release mechanisms in Wisconsin’s criminal justice system. In
Part III, this Article evaluates Wisconsin’s earned release reforms of
2009 and 2011, describing both positive elements and some issues of
concern. On the positive side, Wisconsin’s 2009 reforms reduced the
judicial role in most earned release mechanisms, significantly broadened
the scope of compassionate release, were careful to avoid endangering
public safety, allowed for modification of community supervision
(parole and extended supervision) sentences, and took initial steps to
address offender reentry and to reduce revocation rates for those
19
serving community supervision sentences. The uneven implementation
and funding of these policies, the imperfect communication with the
judiciary, and the complexity and large number of the mechanisms are
20
causes for concern with the 2009 policies.

16. E-mail from Anthony Streveler, Wis. Dep’t of Corr., to author (Jan. 27, 2012).
17. Id. The average daily prison population in 2010 was 20,015. Dee J. Hall, Behind
Bars in Wisconsin: Prison Population Drops 13.6%, WIS. STATE J., Jan. 13, 2011, at A1.
18. This Article is the first to do so, with the exception of Klingele’s complementary
article. See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text.
19. See infra Part III.A.
20. See infra Part III.A.5–.7.
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Wisconsin’s 2011 legislation abolished several of its 2009 earned
release mechanisms and gave judges a stronger role in earned release,
but retained the broadened scope of compassionate release, the policy
focuses on reducing revocation and recidivism rates, and the ability to
21
modify probation sentences. As part of its analysis of these changes,
this Article argues that while there are a variety of defensible earned
release arrangements, executive branch actors should have most of the
responsibility for earned release, with judges playing a secondary, more
limited role.
Drawing on Wisconsin’s experience and recent criminal justice and
governance research, this Article then presents four tentative principles
to guide the successful design and implementation of earned release
legislation in other states. Specifically, state policymakers dealing with
earned release legislation should (a) prevent injustice by monitoring for
bias and requiring structured, recorded decision-making; (b) ensure
effective implementation through strategic governance; (c) prevent
earned release from harming public safety; and (d) complement earned
release with other measures designed to decrease incarceration in ways
consistent with public safety. Implemented in this way, earned release
can play an important role in moving toward a new, more sustainable
sentencing era involving less incarceration and enhanced public safety.
In addition to these benefits, this approach to earned release could help
bring the rule of law to sentencing decisions, thereby correcting the
22
long-lamented “lawlessness” of sentencing. Part IV briefly summarizes
this Article’s arguments, and discusses promising areas for future
scholarship.
II. EARNED RELEASE: NATIONAL TRENDS AND WISCONSIN’S
CURRENT SYSTEM
A. Earned Release’s Rapid Rise
During the 1990s, most U.S. states shifted from an indeterminate
sentencing system—in which parole boards had wide latitude to release
inmates—to determinate systems requiring inmates to serve far larger
23
Though described as “truth-inproportions of their sentence.
21. See, e.g., 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 93b (amending WIS. STAT. § 973.09(3)(d)(intro.) to give
the sentencing court the authority to modify an inmate’s period of probation).
22. See infra Part III.B.1.b.
23. PAULA M. DITTON & DORIS J. WILSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
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sentencing,” these measures did not set sentences in stone. Rather,
states adopting determinate sentencing still employed earned release
24
mechanisms such as parole and sentence credit for good behavior. By
the year 2000, of the forty-two states that had adopted truth-insentencing practices, twenty-nine of them required inmates to serve only
85% of their sentences—the level required to receive federal funding
25
under one federal program. Several other states required less: four
states only required 50%, and three states required between 50% and
26
85%.
Truth-in-sentencing and other “tough-on-crime” policies, combined
with a mild economic recession, caused many states to experience severe
27
budget crises and prison overcrowding in the early 2000s. In response,
over thirty states enacted major reforms that cut costs by reducing
prison populations and combated recidivism by investing more
resources in drug treatment, intensive community supervision, and other
28
measures. As part of this trend, some states revised their truth-insentencing schemes to reduce incarceration. Eight states introduced
new earned release provisions, and twenty states scaled back mandatory
29
minimum sentencing laws or other harsh penalties. These widespread

JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT: TRUTH IN SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS 1–3
(1999), available at http://bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/tssp.pdf.
24. Id. at 1.
25. Id. at 2 tbl.1, 3; Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 13701–04 (2006) (referring to violent offenders).
26. DITTON & WILSON, supra note 23, at 2.
27. See JUDITH A. GREENE, FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, POSITIVE
TRENDS IN STATE-LEVEL SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONAL POLICY 6 (2003), available at
www.famm.org/Repository/Files/82751_Positive%20Trends.pdf (describing recent trends in
criminal justice reforms at the state level as a result of state budget crises); JUDITH GREENE
& KEVIN PRANIS, JUSTICE STRATEGIES, TREATMENT INSTEAD OF PRISONS: A ROADMAP
FOR SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONAL POLICY REFORM IN WISCONSIN 58–59 (2006),
available at http://www.csdp.org/research/Wisconsin_Report_Treatment_Instead_of_Prisons
_Jan_06.pdf.
28. GREENE & PRANIS, supra note 27, at 58–59.
29. Id.; see also ALISON LAWRENCE, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, STATE SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS LEGISLATION 2007 ACTION, 2008
OUTLOOK 10–13 (2008), available at http://www.ncsl.org/print/cj/07sentencingreport.pdf
(outlining recent and forthcoming changes to corrections and sentencing policy at the state
level); JON WOOL & DON STEMEN, VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, CHANGING FORTUNES OR
CHANGING ATTITUDES? SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS REFORMS IN 2003, at 2–7 (2004),
available at http://www.vera.org/publication_pdf/226_431.pdf (discussing 2003 changes in
state-level sentencing policy); Fox Butterfield, With Cash Tight, States Reassess Long Jail
Terms, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2003, at A1.
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reforms have prompted observers to speak of a shift from the “tough30
on-crime” mentality of the 1990s to a “smart-on-crime” paradigm.
With the 2008 financial meltdown and the ensuing deep recession,
budgetary pressures on states increased dramatically, setting off a new
31
wave of criminal justice reform. These reforms have involved various
elements, but earned release is probably the most visible and prominent,
and certainly the most controversial, cost-saving strategy. Numerous
states have recently passed earned release reforms—amounting to
thirty-six states in the last decade—and others are considering such
32
legislation. In several states, earned release policies have already come

30. GREENE, supra note 27, at 5. This trend is also consistent with the “rule-of-law
sentencing” approach, which seeks to promote well-reasoned sentencing decisions and a
strategic restructuring of corrections, both based on using the tools most likely to achieve just
punishment and public safety. See Michael E. Smith & Walter J. Dickey, Reforming
Sentencing and Corrections for Just Punishment and Public Safety, in SENTENCING &
CORRECTIONS: ISSUES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, at 1, 5–6 (Papers from the Executive
Sessions
on
Sentencing
and
Corrections
No.
4),
available
at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/175724.pdf.
31. As the Detroit News observed,
Kentucky, Minnesota, New York, Rhode Island, Texas and Washington are among
more than a dozen states that tweaked their sentencing structure in 2009—from
raising the bar on what constitutes a felony, to narrowing the definition of a habitual
offender or removing mandatory minimum sentences for some crimes.
At the same time, states are investing more in programs—from mental health
services, to substance abuse treatment and job training—that research has shown to
reduce recidivism . . . .”
Karen Bouffard, Gov’s Plan to Release Inmates Under Fire, DETROIT NEWS, Mar. 8, 2010, at
A1 (discussing the Michigan governor’s legislative proposals to increase opportunities for
earned release and the already-enacted increase in parole release).
32. See id.; Michael M. O’Hear, Beyond Rehabilitation: A New Theory of Indeterminate
Sentencing, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1247 app. at 1288–92 (2011) (presenting a comprehensive
chart of recent earned release reforms at the state level); Michael M. O’Hear, The EarlyRelease Renaissance: Reflections and a Legislative Update, MARQ. UNIV. L. SCH. FACULTY
BLOG (Feb. 25, 2011), http://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/2011/02/25/the-early-releaserenaissance-reflections-and-a-legislative-update/; see also JUDITH GREENE & MARC MAUER,
THE SENTENCING PROJECT, DOWNSCALING PRISONS: LESSONS FROM FOUR STATES (2010),
available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/publications/inc_downscaling
prisons2010.pdf (examining how four states—New York, Michigan, New Jersey, and
Kansas—have significantly reduced their prison population and thus the cost of operating
their respective prison systems); CHRISTINE S. SCOTT-HAYWARD, VERA INSTITUTE OF
JUSTICE, THE FISCAL CRISIS IN CORRECTIONS: RETHINKING POLICIES AND PRACTICES 9–
11 (2009) (discussing changes some states have made in the length of prison terms to help cut
costs); Klingele, Changing the Sentence, supra note 8, at 485–94 (discussing the rise of
different types of earned release mechanisms in various states).
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under fire for allegedly endangering public safety.33 But the cumulative
impact of earned release and other reforms has resulted in the
stabilization of the U.S. prison population, which actually dropped
34
Some states, including Wisconsin, experienced
slightly in 2010.
35
significant decreases in imprisonment.
For the purposes of this Article, I assume that public safety can be
increased even while reducing the prison population, that some form of
earned release is justified and necessary, and that the nation would
36
benefit from the establishment of a new sentencing era. This smart-oncrime era would be characterized by falling incarceration levels,
increased opportunities for earned release, widespread reliance on
alternatives to incarceration, and substantial investments in programs
proven effective in preventing crime and integrating offenders into
37
society. Transitioning to such an era is all the more urgent given the
growing evidence of the general harmfulness of over-incarceration and,

33. See Klingele, Early Demise, supra note 9, at 429–39 (analyzing cases of failed earned
release policies); Dee J. Hall & Mary Spicuzza, Slow Start to Earned Release: State’s New
Prison Program Draws Criticism for Robbing Judges of Sentencing Power and a Failure to
Realize Savings, WIS. STATE J., Mar. 21, 2010, at A1.
34. Hall, supra note 17 (noting a drop in the nation’s state prisoner population in 2010,
the first drop in 38 years).
35. Id.
36. See ALISON LAWRENCE, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGIS., CUTTING
CORRECTIONS COSTS: EARNED TIME POLICIES FOR STATE PRISONERS 1–4 (2009),
available
at
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/Earned_time_report_
%20NCSL.pdf?n=6022; Clear & Schrantz, supra note 1, at 152S–53S (discussing ways to
reduce prison populations and the public safety implications). See generally Nora V.
Demleitner, Editor’s Note, Replacing Incarceration: The Need for Dramatic Change, 22 FED.
SENT’G REP. 1 (2009) (discussing the need for dramatically lowering the federal prison
population while focusing on improving public safety, and strategies for accomplishing this);
Ben Trachtenberg, Note, State Sentencing Policy and New Prison Admissions, 38 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 479 (2005) (analyzing factors influencing lower rates of imprisonment in certain
U.S. states, and making recommendations for lowering prison populations generally).
37. See generally Jim Webb, Why We Must Fix Our Prisons, PARADE (Mar. 29, 2009),
http://www.parade.com/news/2009/03/why-we-must-fix-our-prisons.html (“With so many of
our citizens in prison compared with the rest of the world, there are only two possibilities:
Either we are home to the most evil people on earth or we are doing something different—
and vastly counterproductive. Obviously, the answer is the latter.”). America’s higher rates
of incarceration are caused mainly by government policies, not differing crime rates. See
MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 33 (2d ed. 2006); Francis T. Cullen, Cheryl Lero
Jonson & Daniel S. Nagin, Prisons Do Not Reduce Recidivism: The High Cost of Ignoring
Science, 91 PRISON J. 48S, 54S–60S (2011) (reviewing research showing the lack of evidence
that prisons reduce recidivism, and presenting some evidence that imprisonment increases
crime).
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in particular, incarceration’s devastating effect on African-American
38
individuals and communities.
The present economic and political climate is ideal for ambitious
reforms of this nature. There have long been voices on the left calling
for major criminal justice reform.
But now even conservative
Republicans, such as Newt Gingrich and Grover Norquist, have begun a
national campaign (dubbed “Right on Crime”) focused on “intelligently
39
reducing” the prison population.
Earned release policies are potentially important in bringing about a
new sentencing era, and not just because their botched implementation
might lead to a return to tough-on-crime policies, which could drive the
40
country’s unnecessarily high incarceration rates even higher. They are
also important because they can help lower prison populations, motivate
offenders to cooperate with rehabilitative programs and engage in

38. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
COLORBLINDNESS 7 (2010); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TARGETING BLACKS:
ENFORCEMENT AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES (2008), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0508_1.pdf (reviewing racial discrimination in
the War on Drugs); Katherine Beckett et al., Drug Use, Drug Possession Arrests, and the
Question of Race: Lessons from Seattle, 52 SOC. PROBS. 419, 436 (2005) (demonstrating that
racist assumptions, and not legitimate policy considerations, cause the disproportionate
enforcement of drug laws on African-Americans in Seattle); Klingele, Early Demise, supra
note 9, at 418–22 (analyzing the “problem of overincarceration”); Marc Mauer, Addressing
Racial Disparities in Incarceration, 91 PRISON J. 87S, 91S–95S (2011) (discussing evidence for
racial bias at each decision point in the criminal justice system); Jesse J. Norris, State Efforts
to Reduce Racial Disparities in Criminal Justice: Empirical Analysis and Recommendations for
Action, 47 GONZAGA L. REV. 493 (2012); Devah Pager, Bruce Western & Bart Bonikowski,
Discrimination in a Low-Wage Labor Market: A Field Experiment, 74 AM. SOC. REV. 777,
789–90 (2009) (recognizing that discrimination against ex-felons can be worse for blacks than
whites); Becky Pettit & Bruce Western, Mass Imprisonment and the Life Course: Race and
Class Inequality in U.S. Incarceration, 69 AM. SOC. REV. 151 (2004) (documenting the
astoundingly high rates of black imprisonment); Michael Tonry & Matthew Melewski, The
Malign Effects of Drug and Crime Control Policies on Black Americans, 37 CRIME & JUST. 1
(2008) (documenting the negative effects of drug policies on black communities); see also
INTERN’L CTR. FOR SCIENCE IN DRUG POL’Y, EFFECT OF DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT ON
DRUG-RELATED VIOLENCE: EVIDENCE FROM A SCIENTIFIC REVIEW 15 (2010), available at
http://www.iscsdp.org/docs /ICSDP-1%20-20%FINAL.pdf (reviewing evidence that enforcing
drug laws actually increases violence); Katherine Beckett, Kris Nyrop & Lori Pfingst, Race,
Drugs, and Policing: Understanding Disparities in Drug Delivery Arrests, 44 CRIMINOLOGY
105, 107–09 (2006) (demonstrating that racist assumptions may have a role in the
disproportionate enforcement of drug laws on African-Americans in Seattle).
39. Newt Gingrich & Pat Nolan, Prison Reform: A Smart Way for States to Save Money
and Lives, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2011, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011
/01/06/AR2011010604386.html.
40. See supra Part I.
THE AGE OF
DRUG LAW
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serious post-release planning, and stimulate policymakers to build and
41
improve upon programs facilitating offender reentry into society. At
the same time—as argued in Part III—states should not rely exclusively
on earned release, which can be less effective and sustainable than other
complementary reforms that reduce prison admissions.
B. Wisconsin: Five Sentencing Systems in Twelve Years
Remarkably, Wisconsin has experienced five distinct sentencing
systems within twelve years. Until December 31, 1999, an indeterminate
sentencing system—paradoxically still referred to as the “new law”—
made inmates eligible for discretionary parole release after serving 25%
42
of their sentences or a minimum of six months. Inmates usually had to
43
be released after serving two-thirds of their sentences.
Beginning in the year 2000, Wisconsin switched to a completely
different system, sentencing all felons under a determinate sentencing
44
Under truth-in-sentencing
scheme known as “truth-in-sentencing.”
(TIS), which is still in force today despite several changes in the past
decade, courts impose a “bifurcated sentence” by specifying the precise
periods of imprisonment and extended supervision (the term used
45
From 2000 to October 2009, the Parole
instead of “parole”).
Commission played no part in TIS inmates’ release, and “good time,”
46
which reduced prison terms for good behavior, no longer existed.

41. See supra notes 29, 32, 36, 38 and accompanying text.
42. See WIS. STAT. § 302.11 (2007–2008). For certain “serious” felonies, the mandatory
release date was only “presumptive,” and thus the Parole Commission had the option of not
releasing the inmate after serving two-thirds of the sentence. Id. § 302.11(1g). Disciplinary
infractions could extend inmate’s mandatory release date. Id. § 302.11(2). The “old law”
refers to the previous indeterminate sentencing system, which applies to offenders who
committed crimes before June 1, 1984. Meredith Ross, Sentence Modification and Early
Release for TIS Inmates, WIS. DEFENDER, Winter/Spring 2005, at 4, 4 & n.4, available at
http://www.wisspd.org/html/publications/WdefWinSpr05/ WinSpr2005.pdf.
43. WIS. STAT. § 302.11(1) (1995–1996).
44. WIS. STAT. § 973.01(1), (6) (2009–2010) (specifying that offenders who commit
crimes on or after that date are not eligible for parole); see also Brenda R. Mayrack, Note,
The Implications of State ex rel. Thomas v. Schwartz for Wisconsin Sentencing Policy After
Truth-in-Sentencing II, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 181, 191–94.
45. WIS. STAT. § 973.01(2) (2009–2010).
46. 1997 Wis. Act 283, § 419(4); WIS. STAT. § 973.01(6) (2009–2010) (indicating parole
release is unavailable for inmates sentenced under truth-in-sentencing); WIS. STAT.
§ 973.01(4) (indicating the inapplicability of “good time” to truth-in-sentencing inmates).
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During the TIS-I period, from 2000 to 2003, Wisconsin’s sentencing
47
system was among the most restrictive in the nation. Inmates had to
serve every day of their sentences, and potentially more because
48
negative conduct reports actually increase sentences. Only Wisconsin
49
and Alaska required inmates to serve 100% of the sentence.
Moreover, in a number of states TIS applied only to violent crimes, but
50
in Wisconsin it applied to all felonies. In Wisconsin, as in other states,
truth-in-sentencing legislation led to serious budgetary problems,
prompting the revaluation and reform of sentencing policy. As critics
51
predicted, Wisconsin’s truth-in-sentencing sharply increased sentences,
52
potentially costing the state billions of dollars.

47. See GREENE & PRANIS, supra note 27, at 17.
48. WIS. STAT. § 302.11(2) (2007–2008).
49. Id.; ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.55.125(f) (Supp. 2009); ALASKA STAT. § 33.20.010(a)
(2010); WIS. STAT. § 973.01(4), (6) (2007–2008).
50. WIS. STAT. § 973.01(1) (2011). For example, Georgia restricts truth-in-sentencing to
the “seven deadly sins”: violent offenses for which inmates are ineligible for parole.
TIMOTHY CARR, “TRUTH IN SENTENCING” IN GEORGIA (2008), available at
http://www.dcor.state.ga.us/pdf/TruthInSentencing.pdf.
In 2002, several other states,
including Kentucky, Maryland, New York, and Oklahoma, had abolished parole only for
violent offenders or certain violent offenders. See RE-ENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, Parole
Status by State, http://reentrypolicy.org/jc_publications/parole_status_by_state;file (last visited
Feb. 15, 2012). Mississippi recently narrowed its truth-in-sentencing system to exempt many
drug offenders. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 47-7-3(1)(h) (2011). In Connecticut, nonviolent
offenders must serve 75% of their sentences before being eligible for parole, while some
violent offenders must serve 85%, and the worst violent offenders must serve 100% of their
sentences. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-125a (West 2009). Pennsylvania recently restored
parole for nonviolent offenders. Press Release, Chuck Ardo, PA Governor Rendell Orders
Continuation of Parole of Non-Violent Offenders (Oct. 20, 2008), available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/10/20/idUS225719+20-Oct-2008+PRN20081020.
The
federal grant system that encouraged the adoption of truth-in-sentencing only required states
to apply it to violent crimes. 42 U.S.C. § 13704 (2006).
51. For example, University of Wisconsin Law School Professor Walter J. Dickey wrote
that truth-in-sentencing would likely necessitate new prison construction, though he
acknowledged that no one really knew what the result of the legislation would be. Walter J.
Dickey, Thinking Strategically About Correctional Resources, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 279, 279
(introducing Timothy Edwards, The Theory and Practice of Compulsory Drug Treatment in
the Criminal Justice System: The Wisconsin Experiment, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 283); WISCONSIN
CRIMINAL PENALTIES STUDY COMMITTEE, FINAL REPORT, at xvii (1999) (summarizing
Walter J. Dickey’s dissent).
52. For discussion on how this “inadvertent lengthening of sentences” may have cost the
state billions of dollars, see Steven Elbow, Democrats Want to Reduce State’s Ballooning
TIMES
(Madison,
Wis.)
(Dec.
3,
2009),
Prison
Population,
CAP.
http://host.madison.com/ct/news/local/govt_and_politics/article_a8068f6a-13ac-5700-bf4982f6172b1675.html (estimating costs of $2.5 billion between 1999 and 2019); Mary Zahn &
Gina Barton, $1.8 Billion, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 21, 2004, at A1; and Editorial,
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Budgetary savings were one of the main motivations behind
revisions to truth-in-sentencing, known as TIS-II, which brought about
the third sentencing system since 1999.
When Governor Scott
McCallum signed the TIS-II legislation in 2002, he described the
legislation as “avoid[ing] millions of dollars in additional incarceration
costs[,] . . . creat[ing] a mechanism to reward prisoner rehabilitation[,
and] allow[ing] consideration of cost-effective alternatives to prison
53
TIS-II lowered maximum penalties for some crimes and
. . . .”
established new earned release mechanisms, including sentence
adjustment, compassionate release, and earned release through two
54
rehabilitative programs.
Wisconsin’s 2009 earned release reforms, inaugurating the fourth
sentencing system within a decade, were even more dramatic. Passed as
part of budgetary legislation in 2009, these TIS-III or “Act 28” measures
55
created several new earned release mechanisms. The general effect of
the legislation was to shift most of the power over earned release
decisions from judges to state officials, including the Earned Release
Review Commission (ERRC)—formerly known as the Parole
Commission—and the Department of Corrections (DOC).

Reform Truth in Sentencing, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL., Nov. 28, 2004, at J4. Over the last
decade, Wisconsin’s prison population has increased by 14%, and is expected to increase
another 25% by 2019 if measures are not taken to stem this growth. Elbow, supra.
53. Gov. Veto Message, SSJR2AB1, 2001 Legis. Bill Hist. WI A.B. 1, 2002 Spec. Sess.,
(Wis. 2002).
54. 2001 Wis. Act 109, § 1143m (amending WIS. STAT. § 973.195 (2009–2010) to its
current form); WIS. STAT. § 302.113(9g) (2007–2008) (allowing inmates who are over age
sixty-five and have served five years or who are over sixty and have served ten years, or who
have a prognosis of less than six months to live, to apply to a judge for sentence reduction if
first approved by the prison’s Program Review Committee); WIS. STAT. § 302.045(2) (2007–
2008) (providing for earned release after completing the Challenge Incarceration Program);
WIS. STAT. § 302.05(3) (2007–2008); WIS. STAT. § 973.01(3g) (2007–2008) (allowing for
earned release after completing the Earned Release Program). The Challenge Incarceration
Program was created in 1991, 1991 Wis. Act 39, § 3131q, but only with the advent of truth-insentencing in 2000 did completing the program entitle the inmate (whether sentenced under
truth-in-sentencing or the old system) to earned release. 1997 Wis. Act 283, §§ 195, 196
(creating WIS. STAT. §§ 302.045(3), (3m) (1997–1998)). The Wisconsin substance abuse
program was created in 1989, but became an automatic earned release program (called
Earned Release Program) after legislation passed in 2003. See 2003 Wis. Act 33, § 2505
(creating WIS. STAT. § 302.05(3) (2003–2004)). Since it only occurred one year later, this 2003
legislation could be considered part of the TIS-II legislation.
55. See, e.g., 2009 Wis. Act 28, § 25 (creating WIS. STAT. § 15.01(2) (2009–2010)); 2009
Wis. Act 28, § 27 (creating WIS. STAT. §15.06(6) (2009–2010)); see also infra Part II.B.
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The most recent change, ushering in the fifth sentencing regime in
twelve years, was the result of Wisconsin’s 2010 Republican landslide,
which brought Governor Scott Walker to power and gave Republicans
56
Governor
majorities in both houses of the Wisconsin legislature.
Walker had campaigned on a promise to end earned release, and in mid57
2011, a broad swath of measures was finally enacted. This legislation
abolished most of the earned release mechanisms created in 2009, and
shifted most of the earned-release decision-making power from the
executive branch to judges, while retaining a small sub-set of the 2009
58
reforms.
C. Earned Release Mechanisms for Wisconsin State Prisoners
This Part provides an overview of the statutory mechanisms through
which Wisconsin state prisoners can currently be released before the
maximum term of their sentence, as well as the mechanisms that were
59
created in 2009 and abolished in 2011. Five statutory forms of earned
release are presently available to at least some inmates: (1) parole
release, (2) compassionate release, (3) program-based mechanisms, (4)
sentence adjustment due to age or extraordinary health condition, and
(5) earned release from probation. Another five statutory earned
release mechanisms were abolished in 2011: (1) ERRC release, (2)
positive adjustment time, (3) risk reduction sentence, (4) “certain”
60
earned release, and (5) earned release from extended supervision.

56. Jessica Vanegeren, GOP Sweep Likely Means More State Furloughs, Fewer on
BadgerCare, CAP. TIMES (Madison, Wis.) (Nov. 3, 2010), http://host.madison.com/ct/news
/local/govt-and-politics/elections/article_69f86356-e74d-11df-b068-001cc4c002e0.html.
57. See 2011 Wis. Act 38; see also Patrick Marley, Walker Signs Bill Repealing Early
Release, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (July 19, 2011), http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics
/125814448.html; Steve Schultze, Walker Says No to Early Release, JSONLINE (Feb. 19, 2009),
http://www.jsonline.com/blogs/news/39858997.html.
58. See WIS. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, ACT MEMO: 2011 WISCONSIN ACT 38, REPEAL OF
EARLY
RELEASE,
http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lc/publications/act/2011/act038-sb057.pdf
(summarizing the effect of the legislation on early release). See generally Part II.C.
59. Wisconsin also has common law forms of sentence modification, but these are not
relevant to this Article’s analysis of earned release mechanisms. I analyze these doctrines in
another article. Jesse J. Norris, Should States Expand Judicial Sentence Modification? A
Cautionary Tale, 35 HAMLINE L. REV. 101, 115–32 (2012).
60. WIS. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, supra note 58, at 1.
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1. Parole Release
For inmates who committed offenses before December 31, 1999, the
Parole Commission retains the discretionary authority to release them
61
earlier than their release date. However, over the last two decades the
Parole Commission has become increasingly reluctant to release inmates
to community supervision, and has thus released a larger share of
62
inmates near or on their mandatory release dates. Previously, the
Commission released inmates after serving, on average, 50% of their
63
sentences.
The 2009 sentencing reforms changed the name of the Parole
Commission to the ERRC, but the 2011 measures restored its original
64
name. From 2009 to 2011, the ERRC played a role in several other
65
earned release mechanisms. As described below, the ERRC was the
main decision-maker for ERRC release, compassionate release, and two
of the three forms of positive adjustment time. It remains to be seen
whether, in line with the state’s general policy at that time of facilitating
earned release, the ERRC granted eligible inmates parole earlier than
the Parole Commission.
2. Compassionate Release
TIS-II legislation also created an earned release mechanism
applicable to inmates of advanced age or with less than six months to
live. TIS-III significantly broadened these provisions, dropping the
66
The term “compassionate
requirement of a terminal condition.
61. WIS. STAT. § 304.06 (2009–2010).
62. Interview with Walter J. Dickey, George H. Young Chair, Univ. of Wis. Law Sch.,
Former Sec’y, Wis. Dep’t of Corr. (Apr. 10, 2009); see also State v. Wood, 2007 WI App 190,
¶ 3, 305 Wis. 2d 133, 738 N.W.2d 81 (quoting a 1994 letter from Governor Tommy Thompson
to the Department of Corrections secretary urging the department “to pursue any and all
available legal avenues to block the release of violent offenders who have reached their
mandatory release date”). The mandatory release date occurred after the inmate has served
two-thirds of the prison sentence. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
63. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. “The percentage of the prison sentence
served was somewhat higher for shorter sentences, and significantly lower for extremely long
sentences, but the overall average was fifty percent.” Interview with Walter J. Dickey, supra
note 62.
64. 2009 Wis. Act 28, § 25 (amending WIS. STAT. § 15.02 (2007–2008) to change the
name of the Parole Commission to the Earned Release Review Commission); 2011 Wis. Act
38, § 1 (amending WIS. STAT. § 15.02 (2009–2010) to change the name of the Earned Release
Review Commission to the Parole Commission).
65. See WIS. STAT. § 304.06 (2009–2010).
66. WIS. STAT. § 302.113(9g) (2007–2008). Inmates in prison for a class B felony were
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release” in Wisconsin has traditionally referred to a DOC procedure for
granting parole for health reasons, which is still applicable to non-TIS
67
inmates. This Article uses the term “compassionate release” for the
earned release mechanism applying to TIS inmates because it has
become a nationally recognized generic term for statutes allowing
earned release for age or health reasons.
Under the TIS-II statute, known as geriatric/terminal release, an
inmate who had less than six months to live, or who was either over
sixty-five years old and had served over five years of the prison
sentence, or over sixty years old and had served over ten years, could
68
apply to the prison’s Program Review Committee for earned release.
If the Committee determined the inmate’s release to be in the public
interest, the inmate could petition the sentencing judge to grant the
69
This statute is no longer applicable because the TIS-III
release.
legislation replaced it with a similar but more permissive earned release
70
mechanism, which was available to all TIS inmates.

ineligible. Id. See generally Gregory J. O’Meara, Compassion and the Public Interest:
Wisconsin’s New Compassionate Release Legislation, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 33, 33–34 (2010).
For discussions of age- and health-related releases generally, see TINA CHIU, VERA
INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, IT’S ABOUT TIME: AGING PRISONERS, INCREASING COSTS, AND
GERIATRIC RELEASE (2010); John A. Beck, Compassionate Release from New York State
Prisons: Why Are So Few Getting Out?, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 216 (1999) (discussing New
York’s deficiencies in its compassionate release and suggesting change); Berry III, supra note
7; Nadine Curran, Blue Hairs in the Bighouse: The Rise in Elderly Inmate Population, Its
Effect on the Overcrowding Dilemma and Solutions to Correct It, 26 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. &
CIV. CONFINEMENT 225 (2000); Timothy Curtin, The Continuing Problem of America’s Aging
Prison Population and the Search for a Cost-Effective and Socially Acceptable Means of
Addressing It, 15 ELDER L.J. 473 (2007); Jason S. Ornduff, Releasing the Elderly Inmate: A
Solution to Prison Overcrowding, 4 ELDER L.J. 173 (1996) (considering various ways to
handle aging inmates); Marjorie P. Russell, Too Little, Too Late, Too Slow: Compassionate
Release of Terminally Ill Prisoners—Is the Cure Worse Than the Disease?, 3 WIDENER J. PUB.
L. 799, 818–32 (1994) (surveying compassionate release statutes across the United States).
67. Wis. Dep’t Corr., Div. of Adult Insts., Extraordinary Circumstances/Compassionate
Release, Department of Corrections Internal Management Procedure (Apr. 1, 2012). It
allows release because of “[a]dvanced age, infirmity or disability of the inmate, need for
treatment or services not available within a correctional institution, a sentence to a term of
imprisonment that is substantially disparate from the sentence usually imposed for a
particular offense, or other circumstances warranting an earned release.” Id.
68. WIS. STAT. § 302.1135 (2009–2010), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 47. Terminally
ill inmates had to obtain affidavits from two physicians diagnosing a terminal condition. Id.
The inmate needed to have had less than six months to live, even with “life-sustaining
treatment provided in accordance with the prevailing standard of medical care.” Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.; see also 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 47.
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The TIS-III legislation removed the judicial role in the release
decision, retained the age and length of sentence provisions, and
required an “extraordinarily health condition” rather than a terminal
condition for applicants not meeting the age and length of sentence
71
An extraordinary health condition can include any
requirements.
condition, including “advanced age, infirmity, or disability of the person
or a need for medical treatment or services not available within a
72
correctional institution.”
To apply for compassionate release from 2009 to 2011, an inmate
submitted a petition to the ERRC. If the applicant did not meet the age
and length of sentence requirements, he or she had to provide affidavits
73
from two physicians documenting the extraordinary health condition.
If the ERRC rejected the petition, the inmate could appeal to a court,
which would review the decision under the deferential abuse of
discretion standard, and the inmate could not apply again until a year
74
later.
The 2011 legislation altered the procedure slightly but retained the
provision allowing for compassionate release because of an
extraordinary health condition. Instead of applying to the ERRC, the
75
The
inmate applies to the prison’s Program Review Committee.
Committee may reject the petition if it determines that the release
76
would not be in the public interest. If the Committee believes the
release would be in the public interest, the court holds a mandatory
77
hearing. If the inmate proves “by the greater weight of the credible
evidence” that his or her release would be in the public interest, the
78
court must release the inmate.

71. Id.; 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 45.
72. 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 45.
73. Id. § 302.1135(3), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 47.
74. Id. § 302.1135(8), (9), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 47. Indigent inmates pursuing
compassionate release may be represented by a public defender, though the State Public
Defender has the power to decide whether to represent the inmate. Id. § 302.1135(10),
repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 47. This is also the case under the current law. WIS. STAT.
§ 302.113(9g)(j) (2009–2010).
75. 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 45 (creating WIS. STAT. § 302.113(9g)(c)).
76. Id. (creating WIS. STAT. § 302.113(9g)(cm)).
77. Id. (creating WIS. STAT. § 302.113(9g)(d)).
78. Id. (creating WIS. STAT. § 302.113(9g)(e)).
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3. Program-Based Release
Program-based release mechanisms are another method of sentence
reduction arising from TIS-II legislation. Completing either the Earned
Release Program (ERP) or Challenge Incarceration Program (CIP)
79
entitles inmates release to parole or extended supervision. For TIS
inmates to take advantage of these programs, the judge must declare the
80
offender eligible at sentencing. The ERP, originally a residential drug
81
treatment program, was temporarily expanded by TIS-III legislation to
82
The Challenge
apply to those without drug treatment needs.
Incarceration Program (CIP), created in 1990, is a rigorous “boot camp”
program, which was also originally designed for drug treatment but was
83
The 2011 (TIS-IV) legislation
broadened by TIS-III legislation.
reversed these changes, changing the name from Earned Release
Program to “Wisconsin substance abuse program,” and restricting CIP
84
to offenders with substance abuse problems.

79. WIS. STAT. § 302.045(3m) (2009–2010); WIS. STAT. § 302.05(3)(c) (2009–2010),
amended by 2011 Wis. Act 38, §§ 19, 26–27. For TIS inmates, the remainder of the prison
term is added to the inmate’s extended supervision. WIS. STAT. § 302.045(3m) (2009–2010);
WIS. STAT. § 302.05(3)(c) (2009–2010), amended by 2011 Wis. Act 38, §§ 19, 26–27.
80. WIS. STAT. § 302.045(2)(cm) (2009–2010); WIS. STAT. § 302.05(3)(a)(2) (2009–2010);
WIS. STAT. § 302.05(3)(c)(2) (2007–2008), amended by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 27; see also Ross,
supra note 42, at 7. TIS-I inmates—who were sentenced before ERP existed—can, with the
Department’s approval, petition the judge to declare them eligible for ERP. Initially, the
Department’s policy was not to allow TIS-I inmates to petition the judge, but after State v.
Johnson, the Department now allows TIS-I inmates to do so, once they have demonstrated
they are statutorily eligible. State v. Johnson, 2007 WI App 41, ¶ 17; 299 Wis. 2d. 785; 730
N.W.2d. 661; see also Memorandum from Office of the Public Defender, Earned Release
Program 4-40–41 (2007), available at http://www.wisspd.org/htm/ATPracGuides/SER/ERP
.pdf.
81. WIS. STAT. § 302.05 (2009–2010), amended by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 19 (changing the
name from the “Earned Release Program” to the “Substance Abuse Program”); Tony
Streveler, Earned Release Program: An Overview of the Eligibility Criteria and Program, WIS.
DEFENDER, Fall 2003, at 4, 6 (2003).
82. The change was from “Substance abuse program” to “Earned release program” in
the 2009 Act and then back to “Substance abuse program” in the 2011 Act. See 2011 Wis. Act
38, § 16 (amending 2009 Wis. Act 28, §§ 2703–04 (amending WIS. STAT. § 302.045(2) (2009–
2010))).
83. WIS. STAT. § 302.045(2) (providing that the program is available to those with drug
treatment needs or other treatment needs related to their criminal offense); Timothy A.
Nelson, Challenge Incarceration Program: An Overview, WIS. DEFENDER, Fall 2003, at 16,
16–17 (noting the previous requirement that inmates have a substance abuse treatment need).
84. WIS. STAT. § 302.05(1)(am) (2009–2010); id. § 302.045(2)(d).
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4. Sentence Adjustment
The TIS-II reforms included “sentence adjustment,” a statutory
85
earned release mechanism that went into effect in 2003. With the
exception of offenders convicted of the most serious crimes, all TIS
inmates can apply to the sentencing court for sentence adjustment after
serving 75% or 85% (depending on the offense classification) of their
86
In
prison sentences, regardless of when their offenses occurred.
response to an inmate’s timely sentence adjustment petition, the
87
sentencing judge may order the inmate’s earned release. The time the
judge removes from the prison portion of the offender’s sentence shifts
to the extended supervision portion, so that the overall length of the
88
bifurcated sentence remains the same. The statute permits judges to
grant sentence adjustments if the inmate has made significant
rehabilitative or educational progress, if the penalties for the offense
have been lowered, if the inmate is subject to a sentence in another
jurisdiction, if the inmate is an illegal immigrant who will be deported
upon release, or if the adjustment would be “otherwise in the interests
89
The 2009 TIS-III legislation phased out sentence
of justice.”
adjustment, making it unavailable for inmates who committed crimes
90
after October 1, 2009 (TIS-III inmates). However, the 2011 legislation
91
restored sentence adjustment in its original form.

85. WIS. STAT. § 973.195 (2007–2008). Inmates with the offense classification A or B,
which together covered most violent crimes, could not apply for sentence adjustment. Id.
86. Id.; State v. Tucker, 2005 WI 46, ¶¶ 2, 23, 279 Wis. 2d 697, 694 N.W.2d 926; State v.
Trujillo, 2005 WI 45, ¶¶ 25, 30, 279 Wis. 2d 712, 694 N.W.2d 933.
TIS-I inmates use the TIS-II offense
87. WIS. STAT. § 973.195 (2009–2010).
classifications for the purpose of determining when they can apply for sentence adjustment.
Tucker, 2005 WI 46, ¶ 23.
88. WIS. STAT. § 973.195(1r)(g).
89. Id. § 973.195(1r)(b). Under the language of the statute, the district attorney or
victim can veto the sentence adjustment, but the Supreme Court of Wisconsin ruled that the
DA’s ability to block sentence adjustment is unconstitutional because it violates the state’s
separation of powers doctrine. State v. Stenklyft, 2005 WI 71, ¶ 105, 281 Wis. 2d 484, 697
N.W.2d 769 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judges can thus
take into account the district attorney’s objection to granting the petition, but the ultimate
decision is for the judge. Id. ¶ 82. Courts have not ruled on whether the victim veto is
unconstitutional.
90. WIS. STAT. § 973.195(1r)(a) (2009–2010) (providing that inmates could only petition
a court for sentence adjustment for sentences imposed before October 1, 2009).
91. 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 94 (removing the provision phasing out judicial sentence
adjustment in WIS. STAT. § 973.195(1r) (2009–2010)).
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5. Earned Release from Probation
From 2009 to 2011, the DOC could grant an early discharge once an
92
offender on probation had served 50% of the probation sentence. The
legislation originally provided that the sentencing court could grant
earned release from probation when certain criteria were met, but
Governor Doyle used his line-item veto powers to eliminate these
93
provisions. Consequently, the DOC had full discretion whether to
grant the earned release, with no requirement to notify or gain approval
94
from a judge. The 2011 legislation changed the procedure so that the
court, not the DOC, makes the final decision about whether to
95
discharge the offender’s probation.
6. ERRC Release
What this Article refers to as ERRC release is essentially a nonjudicial version of sentence adjustment, created by the 2009 legislation
but abolished in 2011. Between 2009 and 2011, TIS-I and TIS-II inmates
could choose to petition the ERRC for release after serving 75% or
85% of their sentences, instead of petitioning the sentencing court as in
96
sentence adjustment. If the inmate had previously petitioned the court
for sentence adjustment for any of the sentences for which the inmate is
incarcerated, the inmate was ineligible to petition for ERRC release
97
through this mechanism for any sentence currently being served.
ERRC release at 75% was available to inmates who committed their
offense before October 1, 2009, and who were convicted of
98
misdemeanors or class F through I felonies. ERRC release at 85% was
available to inmates who committed offenses before the same date and

92. 2009 Wis. Act 28, § 3392d (creating WIS. STAT. § 973.09(3)(d) (2009–2010)). The
legislation also amended a statute to allow discharge from parole or probation to enable the
offender to enroll in the armed forces. 2009 Wis. Act 28, § 2772 (amending WIS. STAT.
§ 304.071).
93. See 2009 Wis. Act 28, § 3392d.
94. See id.
95. 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 93b (amending WIS. STAT. § 973.09(3)(d) (2009–2010)).
96. WIS. STAT § 304.06(1)(bg)(3) (2009–2010) (allowing inmates whose crimes were
committed earlier than October 1, 2009, to petition the ERRC for release after serving 75%
of their sentence); id. § 304.06(1)(bg)(4) (allowing inmates whose crimes were committed
earlier than October 1, 2009, to petition the ERRC for release after serving 85% of their
sentence).
97. Id. § 304.06(1)(bg)(3)–(4).
98. Id. § 304.06(1)(bg)(3).
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who were convicted of class C to E felonies.99 The ERRC had complete
discretion whether to approve release, based on essentially the same
100
The ERRC had to
criteria listed above for sentence adjustment.
notify the sentencing court of its intention to release an inmate through
this mechanism, and the court could veto the release if it held a hearing
on the matter within sixty days of being notified of the inmate’s planned
101
release.
7. Positive Adjustment Time
From 2009 to 2011, positive adjustment time (PAT) allowed inmates
with good behavior to shorten their sentences by 33%, 25%, or 15%,
102
depending on their offense of conviction. Inmates convicted of certain
offenses, ranging from offenses against vulnerable people to “offenses
103
related to ethical government,” were ineligible for PAT release.
“Track A” PAT (PAT-A), which was run by the DOC rather than the
ERRC, allowed offenders convicted of non-violent misdemeanors or
non-violent class F to I felonies to be released after serving 67% of their
104
sentences (or one day off for each two days of good behavior). Under
“Track B” PAT (PAT-B) and “Track C” PAT (PAT-C), the ERRC
could release an inmate who had served 75% or 85% of his or her
105
sentence, respectively. PAT-B applied to offenders convicted of nonviolent misdemeanors or class F to I felonies, including those classified
106
as violent offenses. PAT-C applied to offenders convicted of class C
107
to E felonies.
99. Id. § 304.06(1)(bg)(4). The only difference is that the provision allowing release
because of changed sentencing policies was removed.
100. Id. § 304.06(1)(bn).
101. Id. § 304.06(1)(bk)(2).
102. See WIS. STAT. § 302.113(2)(b) (2009–2010), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 38;
WIS. STAT. § 304.06(1)(bg)(1), (2) (2009–2010), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 58.
103. WIS. STAT. § 302.113(2)(b) (2009–2010), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 38; WIS.
STAT. § 304.06(bg)(1), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 58.
104. WIS. STAT. § 302.113(2)(b) (2009–2010), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 38. The
use of the term “shall” in this provision may have led to the impression that earned release is
mandatory if the inmate has earned time through PAT-A, but the department interpreted it
as discretionary. E-mail from Anthony Streveler, Wis. Dep’t of Corr., to author (Jan. 18,
2011).
105. WIS. STAT. § 304.06(1)(bg)(1)–(2) (2009–2010), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 58.
This amounted to one day off for every three days of good behavior for PAT-B or one day off
for every 5.7 days of good behavior for PAT-C.
106. Id.
107. Id. Violent offenders may qualify for PAT-C, provided their offense was not
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Because inmates only began accruing PAT after October 1, 2009,
PAT may have reduced the confinement sentences of many inmates
108
only slightly. Certain types of disciplinary infractions could reduce the
109
amount of PAT that inmates accumulate. For all three types of PAT
release, the judge could veto the release, but only after holding a
110
hearing.
Although the 2011 measures abolished PAT beginning on August 3,
2011, inmates who had accrued PAT between October 1, 2009, and
111
August 3, 2011, can still achieve reductions in their sentences. To do
so, the inmate petitions the court, which may either reject the petition
112
without a hearing or release the inmate after holding a hearing.
8. Risk Reduction Sentence
In force from 2009 to 2011, the risk reduction sentence permitted
inmates, excluding those convicted of certain offenses, to be released by
113
the DOC after serving 75% of the sentence. As with program-based
mechanisms, the judge had to declare the inmate eligible for a risk
114
reduction sentence at sentencing. To be sentenced to a risk reduction
sentence, inmates had to agree to be evaluated for their “criminogenic
115
The DOC
factors” and to participate in programming or treatment.
was required to prepare a treatment plan for the inmate based on his or
her risk of reoffending, and the inmate had to complete the treatment

committed against a vulnerable person or otherwise excluded under the statute. Id.
108. Interview with Meredith Ross, Dir., Frank J. Remington Ctr., Univ. of Wis. Law
Sch. (Feb. 16, 2010).
109. The language of the statutes specifies that inmates can earn a day of PAT after
serving a certain number of days in which “he or she does not violate any regulation of the
prison or does not refuse or neglect to perform required or assigned duties.” WIS. STAT.
§ 304.06(1)(bg)(1)–(2); id. § 302.113(2)(b). The DOC will likely interpret this to mean that
major conduct reports, but not minor infractions, prevent inmates from earning PAT.
Interview with Meredith Ross, supra note 108.
110. WIS. STAT. § 304.06(1)(bk) (2009–2010), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 59.
111. 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 96 (creating WIS. STAT. § 973.198(1), which deals with sentence
adjustment and positive adjustment time for inmates sentenced between October 1, 2009, and
August 3, 2011).
112. 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 96 (creating § 973.198(3), which outlines the hearing to be held
by the sentencing court).
113. WIS. STAT. § 973.031 (2009–2010), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 92; WIS. STAT.
§ 302.042 (2009–2010), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 13.
114. WIS. STAT. § 973.031 (2009–2010), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 92.
115. Id.
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plan before release.116
Unique among the new earned release
mechanisms, when the DOC released an inmate under the risk
reduction sentence, the extended supervision portion of the sentence
was not lengthened by the amount of incarceration that the inmate did
117
That is, earned release through a risk reduction sentence
not serve.
shortened the overall length of the bifurcated sentence.
The 2011 measures repealed the legislation authorizing risk
reduction sentences. However, offenders sentenced to risk reduction
sentences under the previous law may still achieve release after serving
75% of their sentences, if the DOC determines that the treatment plan
was successfully completed and the inmate maintained a good behavior
118
record.
9. Certain Early Release
“Certain early release,” which was created in 2009 and repealed in
2011, took its name from the statute’s reference to “certain persons”
119
Under certain early release, the DOC could
eligible for release.
release eligible inmates within a year of their original release date, if
approved by the Secretary of Corrections and either the inmate’s prison
120
Only
social worker or the inmate’s community corrections agent.
inmates serving sentences for misdemeanors or nonviolent class F
121
The prison social worker or
through I felonies were eligible.
community corrections agent was required to have “reason to believe”
that the inmate would not engage in “assaultive activity” in the
122
community. The statute did not clarify how they were to make such a
determination. After this prerequisite was met, the Secretary of
123
Corrections made the final decision whether to release the inmate.
Governor Doyle vetoed a provision in the legislation that would have

116. WIS. STAT. § 302.042 (2009–2010), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 13.
117. Interview with Meredith Ross, supra note 108.
118. 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 14m (creating WIS. STAT. § 302.043, outlining the procedure for
inmates currently serving risk reduction sentences to be released under the terms of the prior
risk reduction sentence system).
119. WIS. STAT. § 302.113(9h) (2009–2010), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 46.
Subsection 9(h) was repealed in its entirety.
120. Id.
121. Id. § 302.113(9h)(c)(1).
122. Id. § 302.113(9h)(c)(2).
123. Id. § 302.113(9h); WIS. ADMIN. CODE DOC § 302.41 (current through 659 Wis.
Admin. Reg. (Nov. 1, 2010)).
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allowed a court to veto the release decision.124 The 2011 legislation
125
completely abolished certain early release.
10. Earned Release from Extended Supervision
The 2009 TIS-III legislation authorized the DOC to reduce
community supervision sentences, including extended supervision and
126
probation sentences. From 2009 to 2011, once an offender had served
a minimum of two years of extended supervision while meeting the
conditions of supervision, the DOC could discharge the offender early
127
Before doing so, the DOC had to
from the supervision sentence.
determine that the discharge would be in the interests of justice and
128
provide notice to the victim of the intention to grant the discharge.
129
The 2011 legislation eliminated this form of earned release.
D. Shifts in Decision-Making Authority
Under TIS-II, all the statutory earned release mechanisms available
to TIS inmates required approval by a judge, either at sentencing or
130
when the inmate requested earned release. That changed under TISIII, which placed a large amount of the decision-making responsibility
with the ERRC and DOC. The judge had to pre-approve Risk
124. See 2009 Wis. Act 28, § 2739 (creating WIS. STAT. § 302.113(9h) (2009–2010));
Governor Jim Doyle, Veto Message 3 (Jun. 29, 2009), available at
http://www.doa.state.wi.us/debf/pdf_files/2009-11VetoMessage.pdf.
125. See 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 46.
126. TIS-II legislation included a provision allowing inmates to petition a court to
change the conditions of their extended supervision sentences, within one year before their
release to extended supervision, or after they have served one year of their supervision
sentences. WIS. STAT. § 302.113(7m)(e) (2007–2008). This relates not to the length of
extended supervision, but to the rules the offenders are required to follow as a condition of
their extended supervision sentence. This is a form of sentence modification, since it changes
the substance of the sentence, but it is not a form of earned release, since it does not change
the duration of supervision.
127. WIS. STAT. § 973.01(4m) (2009–2010), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 90.
128. Id.
129. 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 91 (amending WIS. STAT. § 973.01(7) (2009–2010) to prohibit
the department of corrections from discharging the defendant from any custody or
supervision until the entire sentence has been served).
130. The only forms of earned release available during that time for TIS inmates were
program-based mechanisms and sentence adjustment. For program-based mechanisms, the
judge decides at sentencing whether the defendant is eligible to participate in these programs.
See supra note 92 and accompanying text. Through sentence adjustment, the judge has the
discretion to release the inmate before the offender has served the maximum incarceration
sentence. See supra notes 58–72 and accompanying text.
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Reduction Sentences and program-based mechanisms, and judges could
131
The
veto PAT release and ERRC release after holding a hearing.
judge had no role, however, in certain early release, compassionate
release, or earned discharge from community supervision, or in the final
decision to release inmates after serving a Risk Reduction Sentence or
132
The 2011 legislation (which
completing the ERP or CIP programs.
could be called TIS-IV) reversed this trend, placing most of the earned
133
Under the current system of earned
release authority in judges.
release—with the exception of pre-truth-in-sentencing inmates eligible
for parole—the judge either initially declares the defendant eligible for
an earned release program (as in Wisconsin’s substance abuse program
or Challenge Incarceration Program) or makes the final decision
134
whether to approve an offender’s release from prison or probation.
III. DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING EARNED RELEASE: LESSONS
FROM WISCONSIN AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR STATE-LEVEL
STRATEGIES
This Part first evaluates Wisconsin’s new earned release statutes, and
then identifies general principles for successful implementation of
earned release mechanisms, drawing in part on the lessons from
Wisconsin’s experiences. In 2009, Wisconsin multiplied the number of
earned release mechanisms, creating potential confusion and interaction
135
Furthermore, the mechanisms were implemented in an
problems.
uneven manner, and it seemed unclear whether the state would provide
the additional resources necessary to implement the mechanisms
successfully. On the other hand, the reduction of the judicial role in
earned release, the significant broadening of compassionate release, and
the careful attention paid to public safety, suggest that the 2009 earned
release mechanisms could have been applied consistently and could
have resulted in significant cost savings without increasing risks to the
136
However, the 2011 legislation returned nearly all earned
public.
131. See supra notes 77, 104, 110 and accoumpanying text.
132. See supra notes 96, 114, 120, 121, 129 and accompanying text; WIS. STAT.
§ 302.042(4) (2009–2010), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38 § 13.
133. See WIS. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, supra note 59, at 2 (“The Act moves the
authority to discharge from the department to the court . . . .”); Part II.C.
134. See supra notes 89–91, 98, and 130.
135. See 2009 Wis. Act 29, §§ 2703–2712 (amending WIS. STAT. § 302.05 (2009–2010) to
be the “earned release program,” which later was amended by 2011 Wis. Act 38).
136. See infra Parts III.A.1–.3.
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release power to judges, increasing the risk of geographic and racial
137
In support of my argument that administrative officials
disparities.
and not judges should have most of the responsibility for earned release,
I present preliminary data indicating dramatic geographic disparities in
the application of a judicial earned release mechanism, which may have
reinforced racial disparities.
Second, influenced by both Wisconsin’s experience and previous
scholarship, this Article proposes four principles for the successful
implementation of earned release legislation. States experimenting with
earned release should (1) provide for measurements and internal
controls to prevent injustice or disparity in earned release decisions; (2)
structure earned release decisions to avoid increasing risks to public
safety; (3) employ strategic governance to ensure that earned release
mechanisms actually manage to release a substantial number of inmates;
and (4) complement earned release with other measures meant to
reduce incarceration. As part of this discussion, I respond to the
concerns of Professor Harcourt by using initial data to show that the
expanded earned release mechanisms in effect from 2009 to 2011 did not
exacerbate racial disparities and that earned release was responsible for
a small, though non-trivial percentage of total releases. Finally, this Part
concludes by briefly discussing ways in which the Article’s proposals
may contribute in a new way toward the development of a “rule-of-law
sentencing” approach.
A. Evaluating Wisconsin’s Earned Release Mechanisms
1. Reducing the Judicial Role in Earned Release Decisions
The respective roles of administrative officials and judges in earned
release have varied widely over the last decade and a half. Before truthin-sentencing, parole officials had nearly all the power over earned
release. From 2001 to 2009, judges had most of the earned release
authority, but the 2009 reforms gave a much larger share of the decision138
The 2011 legislation
making power to administrative officials.
reversed these changes, vesting virtually all significant power over

137. 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 37 (amending WIS. STAT. § 302.113(2) (2009–2010)).
138. See, e.g., 2009 Wis. Act 29, § 2702 (amending WIS. STAT. § 302.045(3) (2009–2010)),
explaining that the ERRC would determine an inmate’s eligibility for parole).
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earned release in judges.139 This Part argues that it is preferable for
judges to play, at most, a minor role in earned release decisions.
This Part supports this normative claim in two ways. First, it argues
that state actors are, on the whole, better positioned than judges to
make earned release decisions. Second, it demonstrates that in practice,
judge-centered earned release (sentence adjustment under TIS-II)
resulted in vast geographic disparities, which may have reinforced racial
inequality in sentencing. However, more limited roles for judges in
earned release, including the ability to veto earned release after a
hearing or to shorten a sentence through common law mechanisms in
140
are potentially appropriate and useful
certain circumstances,
components of earned release systems.
State officials, such as those in the DOC and the Parole Commission,
are arguably better equipped than judges to make earned release
decisions. State actors have comprehensive, intimate knowledge of the
inmate’s behavior and attitudes while the inmates are incarcerated; are
more qualified than judges to use scientifically validated risk assessment
procedures to determine which offenders are at the highest risk of reoffending; and process enough cases to ascertain whether similar
offenders have typically been released, allowing them to achieve some
141
measure of consistency. In addition, when centralized administrative
actors make release decisions based on the relative risk of different
offenders, prisoners develop incentives to avoid disciplinary infractions
and complete rehabilitative programs, thus decreasing recidivism after
142
If judges in some areas rarely grant
these offenders are released.
139. See, e.g., 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 45 (creating WIS. STAT. § 302.113(9g) and giving the
court the authority to review the department’s determination that an inmate is eligible for
release due to an extraordinary health condition and to hold a hearing to determine if release
is in the public interest); 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 93b (amending WIS. STAT. § 973.08(3)(d)(intro.)
(2009–2010) and giving the sentencing court the sole authority to discharge someone from
probation early).
140. See infra Part II.D; Norris, supra note 60, at 132–34.
141. See David S. Abrams et al., Do Judges Vary in Their Treatment of Race?, J. LEGAL
STUD. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1800840 (using statistical analysis to demonstrate that judges vary significantly in whether
they send minority offenders to prison rather than probation); see also Ilyana Kuziemko,
Should Prison Inmates Be Released via Rules or Discretion?, Q.J. ECON. (forthcoming 2012)
(manuscript at 11) (“[I]f some of the disparities in punishment are due to statistical
discrimination, then because parole boards have substantially more information than do
earlier actors, they may be less prone to discrimination.”).
142. For example, using parole data from Georgia, Kuziemko shows that abolishing
parole led inmates to commit more infractions, complete less programming, and recidivate at
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earned release, making earned release more unpredictable, these
incentives may not be clear enough to positively influence inmate
behavior.
On the other hand, Professor Klingele argues that judicial sentence
modification is more transparent, politically sustainable, and
accountability-enhancing, given that judges are knowledgeable about
local conditions, accountable to the local electorate, and obligated to
143
While there is merit to this
explain their decisions in open court.
argument, in practice judges may not have the detailed knowledge of
local conditions needed to make superior earned release decisions.
Moreover, the fact that judges are elected may make them unwilling to
approve even meritorious releases, because of their fear of being
144
branded “soft on crime” by political opponents.
Another reason to give state officials most of the responsibility for
earned release is that, on an aggregate level, state officials are likely to
grant earned release in a more consistent manner than judges, avoiding
racial and geographic disparities.
Available data indicates that
Wisconsin’s judge-centered earned release system under TIS-II—
specifically, the mechanism known as sentence adjustment—resulted in

a higher rate after release. Kuziemko, supra note 142 (manuscript at 30); see also JOAN
PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER REENTRY 70–71
(2003) (reviewing evidence that parole may increase public safety).
143. Klingele, Changing the Sentence, supra note 8, at 514–20.
144. Indeed, the release of an offender became an issue in a recent Wisconsin Supreme
Court election. See Robert L. Brown, Toxic Judicial Elections: A Proposed Remedy, ARK.
LAW., Fall 2009, at 12, 13 (describing an “egregious and offensive” advertisement by Justice
Michael Gableman, which suggested falsely that his opponent, Justice Louis B. Butler, Jr.,
had found a loophole that allowed a child molester to be released and commit additional
offenses); see also In re Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gableman, 2010 WI 62,
¶ 63, 325 Wis. 2d 631, 784 N.W.2d 631 (split decision in which three justices concluded that
Justice Gableman’s ad, while “distasteful,” had not violated Supreme Court Rule 60.06(3)(c),
while the other three participating justices concluded that the ad did violate the rule). For
discussions of the way that the “tough-on-crime” mentality—and a desire not to appear
“soft”—can affect how elected judges judge, see Keith Swisher, Pro-Prosecution Judges:
“Tough on Crime,” Soft on Strategy, and Ripe for Disqualification, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 317
(2010) (proposing that judges who run on “tough on crime” platforms to win elections have
effectively made themselves impartial and biased and should thus recuse themselves from all
criminal cases); and Joanna Cohn Weiss, Note, Tough on Crime: How Campaigns for State
Judiciary Violate Criminal Defendants’ Due Process Rights, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1101 (2006)
(examining how the media affects a judge’s impetus to appear—or be—“tough on crime” and
proposing that states should adopt recusal measures to protect defendants from due process
violations due to impartiality).
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enormous geographic disparities, which may have worsened the state’s
145
already abysmal racial disparities.
In Racine and Kenosha Counties, which together account for 11.5%
of the state’s African-American prison population, judges only
approved about 1% of sentence adjustment petitions during 2005 and
146
Milwaukee County accounts for 67% of the state’s African2006.
147
While this might understate the number of
American inmates.
petitions granted, the only available data on Milwaukee County
148
indicates an even lower approval rate (.3%). If the Milwaukee County
data is accurate, or if Milwaukee County’s true rate is similar to that of
Kenosha and Racine Counties, then as of 2007, about 79% of the state’s

145. Id.; see infra Part III.B.2; infra notes 146–147.
146. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., Racial Disparities Analysis (2007) (on file with author). Sixtynine inmates sent petitions to Racine County Judges in 2005, but none were approved.
William Rosales, Sentence Adjustment Petition Data (2007) (on file with author). In 2006,
three out of 117 were approved in Racine County. Id. In Kenosha County, there were
twenty-one petitions in 2005 and five in 2006, but none were granted in either year. Id.
Dividing the number of petitions granted in the two counties (3) over the total number of
petitions (212) yields an approval rate for both counties of 1.4% for 2005/2006.
The author derived the sentence adjustment petition approval statistics from a dataset
created by attorney and sociologist William E. Rosales, who used raw data from the
Consolidated Court Automation Programs. Petitions for sentence modification are filed with
the sentencing judge, so the county of conviction, not the county of actual imprisonment, is
referred to in this discussion. WIS. STAT. § 973.198(1).
147. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., supra note 146; Rosales, supra note 146. Only 1 out of 115
petitions was granted in 2005, and none of the 153 petitions were granted in 2006.
148. Rosales, supra note 146; see also William E. Rosales, Sentence Adjustment Petitions:
An Update, WIS. DEFENDER, Winter/Spring 2007, at 1, 4 (indicating that, according to a court
staff member, Milwaukee courts were unaware of the codes for sentence adjustment for an
unspecified period). It should be noted that the dataset includes data from 2002 through
2006, though the 2002 through 2004 data was not analyzed in this Article, due to the low
number of sentence adjustment petitions in that time period. Although we do not know when
the Milwaukee courts were allegedly unaware of the codes for sentence adjustments, it seems
that they became aware of them by 2004, because more sentence adjustment petitions were
recorded for 2004 than for 2005 and 2006. Rosales, supra note 146. It is possible that other
counties had problems with data entry, but there is no evidence that this is the case. In any
event, even if the Milwaukee data understates the true approval rate, there are other reasons
to believe that the Milwaukee approval rate was unusually low. See LEGAL ASSISTANCE TO
INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS PROJECT, § 973.195 SENTENCE ADJUSTMENT PRO SE
PACKET: REVISED TO INCLUDE 2011 WISCONSIN ACT 38 CHANGES 7 (2012), available at
http://law.wisc.edu/fjr/laip/sentence_adjustment_pkt_act_38_2012.pdf
(singling
out
Milwaukee County as having especially low rates of approval); LEGAL ASSISTANCE TO
INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS PROJECT, SENTENCE ADJUSTMENT PRO SE PACKET 7
(2005), available at http://www.wisspd.org/htm/ATPracGuides/Training/ProgMaterials/Conf
2005/Ross/SA.pdf (suggesting that Milwaukee judges in particular require certain kinds of
proof before even considering adjustment petitions).
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black prison population was convicted in counties in which the
149
2005/2006 average approval rate was about 1%. By contrast, in the 67
counties with few blacks sentenced to prison, judges approved on
150
About 67% of the
average 15% of sentence adjustment petitions.
state’s white prison population was convicted in these counties, and
about 77% of the state’s white prison population lives in those counties
or in Dane or Rock County, which had higher approval rates than
151
Milwaukee, Racine, and Kenosha.
If the 2005/2006 Milwaukee data is accurate, petitions filed by
inmates convicted in overwhelmingly white, rural counties were over
eighteen times more likely to be granted than those from the urban
counties in which the vast majority of the state’s African-American
152
prison population were sentenced. This would have likely reinforced
the state’s racial disparities in imprisonment, by shortening sentences for
inmates from overwhelmingly white counties but rarely if ever doing so
for inmates from more diverse counties. However, lacking individuallevel data, it is impossible to demonstrate with certainty that these
153
geographic disparities would have impacted racial disparities. Even if
149. This 79% figure was generated by adding the percentage of the state’s black prison
population accounted for by Milwaukee, Racine, and Kenosha counties. Wis. Dep’t of Corr.,
supra note 146. The average approval rate was .8%. This was calculated by dividing the
number of granted requests in 2005 and 2006 in the three counties by the number of total
requests. Rosales, supra note 146.
150. This figure was generated by calculating the overall approval rate of the 67 counties
for 2005 and 2006, and averaging the two rates. Consol. Ct. Automation Programs, supra
note 146.
151. One of the counties with a large African-American prison population, Dane
County, which accounts for about 8% of the state’s black prison population, has a 2005/2006
approval rate of 17%, slightly higher than the rate for predominantly white counties. Wis.
Dep’t of Corr., supra note 146; Consol. Ct. Automation Programs, supra note 146. Rock
County, which accounts for 2.7% of the state’s black prison population, had an unusually high
2005/2006 approval rate, averaging 37%. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., supra note 146; Consol. Ct.
Automation Programs, supra note 146. While this may indicate that African-Americans have
a greater chance of achieving sentence adjustment in these counties, it should be noted that a
large proportion of prison inmates from these counties (54% in Rock County and 45% in
Dane County) are white.
152. Dividing the average approval rate in the 67 overwhelmingly white counties (15%),
by the average approval rate of Milwaukee, Racine, and Kenosha Counties together yields a
ratio of 18.75 to one. Rosales, supra note 146; see supra note 151 and accompanying text.
153. This said, if the Milwaukee data is accurate, there would only be two ways that
increased racial disparities could not result from these geographic disparities, and neither are
real possibilities. First, if most of the sentence modifications granted in overwhelmingly white
counties were granted to black inmates, this could potentially lead to equitable results on the
aggregate level. Yet given the small proportion of black inmates convicted in those counties

20 - NORRIS (DO NOT DELETE)

1584

7/10/2012 9:19 AM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[95:1551

Milwaukee is excluded, the data still demonstrate striking geographic
disparities between counties, which could have potentially affected
154
racial disparities.
These geographic disparities could be due mainly to the large
workloads of urban courts, or they could result from a number of
different factors. Regardless, administrative decision-makers would
most likely grant earned release with much less geographic disparity
than judges, because these statewide actors would apply the same
considerations and methodology to inmates regardless of location. It is
possible that due to the nature of the communities to which the inmates
will be returning, or the types of offenses committed in different areas,
the rate of earned release will vary somewhat among geographic areas.
However, the wide disparities under judicial sentence adjustment would
be highly unlikely to occur if state officials alone were in charge of
155
earned release.
The more limited role of judges under TIS-III may be an example of
an appropriate and useful role for judges in an earned release system.
To review, during the TIS-II period from 2003 to 2009, trial court judges
were the principal actors with discretionary power to reduce sentences.
TIS-III reduced the judicial role considerably, allowing judges to veto
earned release only for positive adjustment time releases and ERRC
release, and then only if the judges hold a hearing within the time
156
limit.

(usually less than 10% and sometimes less than 5%), this is extremely unlikely. Dep’t of
Corr., supra note 146. Second, if the sentence modifications in Dane or Rock County were
given to blacks at highly disproportionate rates, it is possible that this could at least partially
prevent the geographic disparities from causing racial disparities, by compensating somewhat
for the fact that 79% of the state’s black prison population was convicted in counties in which
judges rarely if ever grant sentence modifications. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
Yet since only Rock County (which accounts for just 2.7% of the black prison population)
had a rate of approval that was significantly higher than average, such an effect cannot
realistically be expected to erase or substantially reduce the overall racial disparity.
154. As noted above, Dane County, which represents about 8% of the state’s black
prison population, has an approval rate similar to that of the mainly white counties, and Rock
County, where 2.7% of the state’s black inmates were convicted, had a higher approval rate.
See supra note 151 and accompanying text. Depending on how many of these sentence
adjustments went to African-Americans, this might have had a balancing effect, preventing
the low approval rates in Kenosha and Racine County from contributing to racial disparities.
155. See supra notes 141–145 and accompanying text.
156. Neither TIS-II nor TIS-III affected the power of courts, under three common law
or constitutional doctrines, to reduce sentences in response to a motion.
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In practice, this requirement may have discouraged judges from
blocking earned release decisions, particularly for judges in populous
urban areas with heavy caseloads. On the other hand, there was a
possibility that judges would hold perfunctory hearings that nearly
always result in vetoing the earned release. This does not seem to have
occurred. Data from the first year of the new earned release system
157
show that courts declined to hold a hearing in 72% of cases. When a
158
This
hearing was held, judges blocked the release 51% of the time.
relatively low rate of hearings probably indicates that judges trusted
administrators to make sound release decisions.
By giving power to both a parole-type commission (the ERRC) and
judges, these two earned release mechanisms—PAT and ERRP
release—represented a curious melding of the TIS-II judge-centered
approach and the pre-TIS parole system. The authors of the 2009
reforms may have thought that preserving a role for judges was
necessary to keep the “truth-in-sentencing” character of the system
intact, but in fact most truth-in-sentencing states have never relied
159
exclusively on judicial forms of earned release.
Alternatively, lawmakers may have decided to retain a judicial veto
to enhance the political legitimacy of the mechanisms, and reduce the
likelihood of negative public safety impacts.
Since judges are
accountable to the communities that elected them, they may be more
reluctant to approve earned releases than state officials. State agency
officials, such as DOC and ERRC personnel, could potentially feel
pressure to make questionable release decisions to save costs or reduce
overcrowding because they are accountable to other administrators, not
the voters. Indeed, recent earned release legislation in other states has
160
already run into controversy for allegedly unwise releases.
Giving judges veto power over decisions is one way to reduce such
abuses and prevent the ensuing political backlash. The advantage of

157. E-mail from Anthony Streveler, supra note 104.
158. Id.
159. See supra Part II.A. The only mechanism for which the judicial veto seems
particularly out of place is positive adjustment time; even those inmates who get their
sentence reduced for good behavior must obtain judicial approval before being released. See
supra Part II.C. This differs from the typical “good time” statute, which in Wisconsin, while it
existed, automatically reduced inmates’ sentences when they avoided major disciplinary
infractions. See WIS. STAT. § 973.01 (2009–2010), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, §§ 88–89.
160. See Klingele, Changing the Sentence, supra note 8, at 494–97. See generally supra
note 4 and accompanying text; Klingele, Early Demise, supra note 9.
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Wisconsin’s approach from 2009 to 2011 was that state officials were
initially in charge of the process, potentially reducing the disparities that
could result from a judge-focused earned release system, and only when
judges were willing to hold a hearing could they intervene in the
process. This system made it less likely that certain judges would veto
all earned release applications, potentially causing geographic or racial
disparities.
The ability of Wisconsin judges to reduce sentences in response to
common law sentence modification motions is an even better example
of an appropriate role for judges in earned release. Judges in Wisconsin
state courts may only grant these common law sentence modifications
161
For this
when the facts of the case conform to specific doctrines.
reason, sentence modification motions are normally granted only in
162
The main common law doctrine,
relatively unusual circumstances.
new-factor sentence modification, requires a court to find that a “new
factor” occurred after sentencing or prior to sentencing without the
knowledge of the parties at sentencing, and that a sentence modification
163
is thus needed to avoid injustice. Since judges are more qualified than
state officials to consider the relevance of particular facts for abstract
notions of justice, it may be more appropriate for judges to decide such
issues. However, if administrative officials have control over an entire
state’s earned release system, these officials can be trained to consider
164
the same types of factors, as discussed below.
Despite making a normative argument, this Part does not articulate
a general principle for states to follow to successfully implement earned
release. In choosing what roles, if any, to assign to judges in the earned
161. Katherine R. Kruse & Kim E. Patterson, Comment, Wisconsin Sentence
Modification: A View from the Trial Court, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 441, 443, 446–48. See generally
Norris, supra note 60.
162. See Kruse & Patterson, supra note 170, at 462. Some examples of new factors
approved by appellate courts include “new information about the defendant’s criminal
record, post-conviction assistance to law enforcement, misunderstandings about the
consequences of the sentence, a clarification to the law relevant to the sentence, the existence
of an untreatable psychological condition, a reduction of the defendant’s restitution, and a
conflict of interest on the part of the person who prepared a psychological report on the
defendant.” Norris, supra note 60, at 13.
163. Rosado v. State, 70 Wis. 2d. 280, 288–89, 234 N.W.2d 69, 73 (1975) (defining a new
factor as “fact or set of facts highly relevant to the imposition of sentence, but not known to
the trial judge at the time of original sentencing, either because it was not then in existence or
because, even though it was then in existence, it was unknowingly overlooked by all of the
parties”).
164. See infra Part III.B.1.b.
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release process, state policymakers must make public policy judgments
based on the values that are most important to them. This may involve
compromising among competing considerations, such as the importance
of uniformity and fairness on the one hand, and the value in making
electorally accountable officials responsible for decisions that will
impact their constituencies on the other.
165
The shift toward judicial control created by the 2011 legislation,
however, may have gone too far. For inmates sentenced after the year
2000 (truth-in-sentencing inmates), the only currently available earned
release mechanisms are sentence adjustment, compassionate release,
and modification of probation (which all require judicial approval) as
well as program-based mechanisms (which require that a judge declare
166
Since compassionate release is
the offender eligible at sentencing).
not applicable to most offenders, and early discharge of probation does
not apply to prison inmates, most inmates have only two realistic
options for earned release: sentence adjustment and program-based
release. Program-based release is only available to those with substance
167
abuse problems, and there are a limited number of spots available.
This leaves judicial sentence adjustment—with its extreme geographic,
168
and possibly racial, disparities —as the most widely-applicable form of
earned release.
Moreover, for those who accrued positive adjustment time between
2009 and 2011, judges can now reject their petition for earned release
without any hearing, and must hold a hearing to grant positive
169
This reverses the situation in force between 2009
adjustment time.
and 2011, which required judges to hold a hearing before rejecting a
170
petition. The 2011 change creates incentives for busy courts to dismiss
all petitions for positive adjustment time, which could further

165. See, e.g., 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 45 (giving the court the authority to review the
department’s determination that an inmate is eligible for release due to an extraordinary
health condition and hold a hearing to determine if release is in the public interest); 2011 Wis.
Act 38, § 93b (amending WIS. STAT. § 973.08(3)(d)(intro.) (2009–2010) and giving the
sentencing court the sole authority to discharge someone from probation early).
166. See supra Part II.C.
167. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
169. 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 96 (creating WIS. STAT. § 973.198(3), which gives the court
authority to deny a petition outright or hold a hearing, and WIS. STAT. § 973.198(5), which
dictates how positive adjustment time should be applied to a bifurcated sentence).
170. WIS. STAT. § 304.06(1)(bk)(1), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 59.
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disadvantaged offenders from populous counties (where most of the
171
state’s minorities reside).
Whatever the division of labor between judges and administrators,
the principles articulated later in this Part will still be applicable. This
said, a system with minimal or no judicial involvement will likely be
easier to manage and implement in a flexible way, since the autonomy
of judges may make them less susceptible to influence than state
officials. For example, if policymakers are concerned that state officials
are not approving meritorious requests for release, they could fire or
discipline the officials. This would obviously not be a possibility for
elected judges.
2. Broadening Compassionate Release
A second positive aspect of Wisconsin’s 2009 earned release
legislation is that the provisions for compassionate release were far
broader than in the previous statute. The TIS-II statute known as
“terminal/geriatric release,” in force from 2003 to 2009, allowed judges
to release TIS inmates with either less than six months to live, who were
sixty-five years old and had served five years of their sentence, or who
172
were sixty years old and had served ten years of their sentence. The
judge could only exercise that authority after the prison’s Program
173
The 2009 legislation
Review Committee signed off on the request.
171. 82% of inmates who were convicted in Milwaukee County (the most populous
county in the state) were African-American. See Wis. Dep’t of Health Servs., Wisconsin
Population Estimates, http://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/population/ (indicating that Milwaukee
County has a population nearly twice that of the second most populous county, Dane
County). Roughly 70% of the African-Americans in Wisconsin reside in Milwaukee County.
U.S. Census Bureau, Wisconsin Quick Facts, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/55000.htm
l (indicating that the 2010 population of Wisconsin was 5,686,986 and that 6.3% of the
population was African-American); U.S. Census Bureau, Milwaukee County Quick Facts,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/55/55079.html (indicating that Milwaukee County has a
population of 947,735, of which 26.8% are black); see also African Americans in Wisconsin,
WIS. DEP’T OF HEALTH SERVICES, http://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/health/minorityhealth/
mhpop/africanameripop2009.htm (“Nearly 90% of Wisconsin’s African American population
lives in the following six counties, all of which are located in Southeastern or Southern
Wisconsin, including Milwaukee, Dane, Racine, Kenosha, Rock, and Waukesha. When
looking at African Americans as a percent of the total county population Milwaukee County
tops this list, with 25.6%.”); WIS. DEP’T OF HEALTH SERVICES, Hispanics/Latinos in
Wisconsin, http://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/health/minorityhealth/mhpop/hispaniclatinopop.htm
(“As of 2008, two-thirds of Wisconsin’s Hispanic/Latino population was concentrated in
Milwaukee, Dane, Racine, Kenosha, and Brown counties.”).
172. WIS. STAT. § 302.1135 (2009–2010), amended by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 47.
173. Id.
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made several improvements.174 The 2011 measures left some of these
changes in place, but gave judges veto power and made certain inmates
175
ineligible for compassionate release.
First, while retaining provisions that allowed release for those of a
certain age who have served a certain amount of time in prison, the 2009
statute removed the terminal diagnosis requirement and instead
176
This
required a showing of an “extraordinary health condition.”
condition, which had to be documented by affidavits from two
physicians, could include age, infirmity, disability or a condition that
177
This essentially allowed the
cannot be treated in the institution.
ERRC to release inmates because of virtually any age- or health-related
178
This is similar to New Jersey’s statute and the proposed
problem.
Model Penal Code Revision’s compassionate release provision, both of
which give judges broad discretion to decide when age, health, or
179
Such flexibility is important because
disability justifies release.
compassionate release decisions are likely to be very fact specific,
hinging on the particulars of the inmate’s condition and the likelihood
that he or she could commit crimes if released. Fortunately, the 2011
180
reforms did not reverse this change in the law.
Second, from 2009 to 2011, administrators alone made
compassionate release decisions, as the judge did not have to pre181
approve each release. While it is ultimately a public policy judgment
174. See infra Part III.A.
175. 2011 Wisconsin Act 38, § 45 (creating WIS. STAT. § 302.113(9g)).
176. 2009 Wis. Act 28, § 2729y (amending WIS. STAT. § 302.1135(3) (2009–2010), which
was repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 47).
177. WIS. STAT. 302.113(9g)(a)(1), repealed by 2009 Wis. Act 28.
178. However, it is possible that since the legislation does not mention “illness,” that a
grave illness that does not qualify as an infirmity or disability would not be grounds for
release. This said, if a serious illness will prevent an inmate from committing further crimes
for the rest of his life, this can fairly be described as a disability or infirmity. Thus the absence
of the term “illness” should not pose an obstacle to meritorious compassionate release
requests.
179. In New Jersey, “A motion may be filed and an order may be entered at any time . . .
amending a custodial sentence to permit the release of a defendant because of illness or
infirmity of the defendant or . . . changing a sentence for good cause shown upon the joint
application of the defendant and prosecuting attorney.” N.J. CT. R. 3:21-10(b) (2009); see
also Frase, supra note 7, at 195 (analyzing proposal to change Model Penal Code’s
compassionate release provisions).
180. See 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 45 (retaining the previous definition of “extraordinary
health condition,” and allowing release of those with such conditions).
181. WIS. STAT. § 302.1135 (2009–2010), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 47. Section
302.1135(8) did permit a person to obtain judicial review of a decision to deny compassionate
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whether judges should retain the right to veto earned release decisions,
it makes for a simpler process to remove the judicial veto. In addition,
since the ERRC would have had comprehensive information about the
offender’s crime and conduct in prison, a sense of when other petitions
have been granted, and extensive knowledge about the inmate’s physical
abilities, the ERRC was well-positioned institutionally to make
compassionate release decisions in a consistent and public safetyprotective manner. The fact that the Program Review Committee’s
approval was no longer necessary was also a welcome change, because it
182
removed an additional, potentially duplicative bureaucratic obstacle.
The 2011 legislation requires that the compassionate release be
approved first by the prison’s Program Review Committee and then by
183
a judge, who is required to hold a hearing. The inmate must “prov[e]
by the greater weight of the credible evidence” that the release would be
184
While there are reasons to prefer that the
in the public interest.
decision be made by administrators alone, it is understandable that the
legislature wanted the judge to make the final determination. The
“greater weight” standard (which has been in effect since compassionate
release was passed as part of the TIS-II legislation) seems appropriate,
because it is not a high standard (like “clear and convincing evidence,”
185
the standard applicable for “new factor” sentence modification ) that
would present an additional obstacle toward compassionate release.
Third, the 2009 legislation applied to inmates convicted of class B
felonies, which expanded the pool of inmates eligible under the statute,
186
but the 2011 legislation reversed this change. Class B felonies include
such crimes as first-degree reckless homicide, second-degree intentional
homicide, and first-degree sexual assault. The policy judgment reflected
in the pre-2009 statute and the 2011 legislation—that the most serious
and violent criminals should never be released on age or health
release by filing a common law writ of certiorari. For a detailed analysis of the changes made
to the compassionate release statute by Act 28, see O’Meara, supra note 66, at 34.
182. See O’Meara, supra note 66, at 34.
183. In this respect, the 2011 legislation returns compassionate release to the procedure
established by the TIS-II legislation. 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 45 (creating WIS. STAT.
§ 302.113(9g)(cm), which requires the sentencing court to hold a hearing after the Program
Committee has determined modification is appropriate); see also O’Meara, supra note 66, at
34.
184. 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 45 (creating WIS. STAT. § 302.113 (9g)(e)).
185. State v. Franklin, 148 Wis. 2d 1, 7–9, 434 N.W.2d 609, 611 (1989).
186. 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 47, repealing WIS. STAT. § 302.1135 (2009–2010). The statute
simply omits the classification-based limitations the statute previously contained. Id.
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grounds—is easy to sympathize with. However, one could argue that
decision-makers should always have the discretion to release an inmate
who is so incapacitated by an illness, such as paralysis or advanced
dementia, that additional offenses are impossible. Such an approach
would allow each case to be evaluated on its own merits, without
excluding offenders based on their offense.
The principle behind this policy can be articulated as follows. The
additional incarceration that an incurably sick or disabled offender
would experience if he or she is not released would have some abstract
punishment or retributive value. But this value, even in this case of the
most serious offenders, will often be outweighed by the lack of risk to
the public, the potential cost savings to the public, and the benefits for
the dignity and quality of the life of the offender and his or her family.
Only an actor familiar with the all the facts is in a position to decide
whether compassionate release is justified in a particular case.
Indeed, compassionate release statutes are an example of an earned
release mechanism that by its very nature should be broad and
bureaucratically uncomplicated. Obviously, the narrower the rules, the
fewer health-incapacitated inmates will be released. More onerous and
multi-layered bureaucratic requirements are also certain to reduce the
number of those released by slowing down the process, discouraging
potential applicants, and giving more actors the opportunity to veto
requests.
The small numbers of inmates released through most compassionate
release statutes across the country makes this simplicity and broadness
187
Indeed, over the last two years, only six
all the more important.
inmates achieved compassionate release, a small fraction of the thirty to
188
The general principles
fifty inmates who die in prison each year.

187. See CHIU, supra note 66, at 6–8 (showing, based on a study of 15 states and the
District of Columbia, that states rarely use their geriatric release statutes); Cara Buckley, Law
Has Little Impact on Compassionate Release for Ailing Inmates, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2010, at
A17 (describing how in New York and several other states, compassionate release statutes
were on the books but often resulted in only a small handful of releases per year).
188. This said, it is possible that many or most of the inmates who died could not have
been released through compassionate release, either because their deaths were unexpected or
because they were ineligible due to being convicted of a Class A offense. E-mail from
Anthony Streveler, Wis. Dep’t of Corr., to author (Nov. 19, 2011) [hereinafter E-mail from
Anthony Streveler Nov.] (providing fact that six inmates had been released). Fifty-two
inmates died in 2002, forty-three in 2003, forty in 2004, thirty-one in 2005, forty-five in 2006,
forty-three in 2007, forty-five in 2008, forty-two in 2009, twenty-five in 2010, and forty-nine in
2011. E-mail from Bonnie Utech, Records Custodian, Wis. Dep’t of Corr. (Feb. 15, 2012).
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developed below, in particular the principle of responsive governance
discussed in Part III.B.2, may help in preventing the under-use of
compassionate release. In any case, if policymakers want to realize the
full potential of compassionate release, they should consider instituting
a process in which all gravely ill or elderly eligible inmates are
automatically considered, instead of relying on individual inmates to
obtain a diagnosis and petition for earned release on their own accord.
3. Prioritizing Public Safety
Another encouraging development in Wisconsin’s 2009 earned
release legislation was the careful, if uneven, attention paid to ensuring
that release is compatible with public safety. The legislation required
the state to develop empirically validated criteria for approving earned
release and, as a result, the DOC implemented an improved system for
189
evaluating the risks posed by individual inmates. The earned release
legislation also focused on nonviolent offenders, making violent
offenders eligible for only a small number of relatively restrictive earned
190
release mechanisms.
First, the legislation directed the ERRC and DOC to develop
scientific criteria for evaluating the likelihood that an individual
191
At the same time, this
offender will commit certain offenses.
“validated and objective assessment of the inmate’s criminogenic factors
and risk of reoffending” only applies to two of the many earned release
192
mechanisms. Even though its use is only statutorily required for two

189. Interview with Anthony Streveler, Wis. Dep’t of Corr. (May 5, 2010) [hereinafter
Interview with Anthony Streveler May]; E-mail from Anthony Streveler, Wis. Dep’t
Corrections (Dec. 5, 2011).
190. 2009 Wis. Act 28, § 2751. For example, PAT-B and PAT-C release were available
to some inmates convicted of violent offenses, but these releases were subject to the
discretionary approval of the ERRC and the judge. See supra notes 125–27, 130 and
accompanying text. Similarly, some violent offenders were eligible for compassionate release,
but compassionate release requires an extraordinary health condition and is subject to
discretionary approval as well. See supra notes 75 and accompanying text. ERRC release
was not available to those convicted of Class A or B felonies, which include the most serious
violent crimes. See supra notes 99, 100 and accompanying text; WIS. STAT. §§ 940.01, 940.02,
940.05, 940.225 (indicating that first-degree intentional homicide is a Class A felony, several
forms of homicide, and first-degree sexual assault, are Class B felonies).
191. WIS. STAT. § 302.042(2)(a) (2009–2010), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 13
(requiring the DOC to “[c]onduct a validated and objective assessment of the inmate’s
criminogenic factors and risk of reoffending” to release an inmate through a risk reduction
sentence).
192. Id.
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forms of earned release, in practice the DOC and ERRC used an
improved risk assessment tool for deciding upon other releases, as well
as deciding upon the intensity of supervision that offenders will be
193
As long as the evaluation instrument is
subject to upon release.
empirically valid, this is surely preferable to ad hoc decisions based on
informal reviews of inmates’ institutional conduct and post-release
plans.
Although the DOC had long used a methodologically problematic
instrument, the DOC has developed an improved assessment
194
procedure. The Justice Center performed a sophisticated analysis of
the state’s current risk evaluation instrument, proposing specific changes
195
For example, the
that would result in significant improvements.
analysis found that the old instrument classified too large a percentage
of offenders as high-risk, making it less useful for distributing resources
toward offenders who pose the greatest risk, and suggested ways to
196
correct the problem. The DOC adopted a new instrument correcting
these flaws, which was immediately implemented and used for all the
197
2009–2011 earned releases.
In any case, as mentioned below, care must be taken to avoid giving
undue weight to these assessment tools, especially when other
198
considerations not incorporated by the tools are relevant to recidivism.
Professor Hannah-Moffat has identified a number of potential problems
with relying on risk assessment in sentencing-related decisions, such as
the potential for overreliance on risk assessment because of excessive
trust in its predictive ability, confusion between correlation and
199
causation, and potential bias against women and minorities.

193. Risk reduction sentences required this assessment, and positive adjustment time
(PAT-B and PAT-C) did not apply to those determined to have a high risk of reoffending
through an “objective risk assessment instrument.” WIS. STAT. § 973.01(3)(d) (2009–2010),
repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 88; see also Interview with Anthony Streveler May, supra note
189.
194. Interview with Anthony Streveler May, supra note 189; see also MIKE EISENBERG
ET AL., COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS JUSTICE CENTER, VALIDATION OF THE
WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT, at iv, vii–
ix (2009), available at http://www.wi-doc.com/PDF_Files/WIRiskValidation_August%2020
09.pdf.
195. EISENBERG ET AL., supra note 194, at vii–viii.
196. Id. at iv–vii.
197. Interview with Anthony Streveler May, supra note 189.
198. See infra notes 199–201.
199. See Hannah-Moffat, supra note 11 (manuscript at 14–15, 17).
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Practitioners need to be made aware of these limitations and biases. In
particular, given Professor Harcourt’s claim that risk assessment
instruments will increase racial disparities, care should be taken to
200
ensure the tools are not unfairly disadvantageous to minorities.
However, so far in Wisconsin, this may not be a problem: the analysis of
201
the old risk assessment tool showed that it did not result in racial bias.
Second, under the 2009 earned release measures, violent and more
serious offenders were ineligible for some of the mechanisms. For other
mechanisms, they had to serve significantly longer proportions of their
202
This said, the
sentences before being eligible for earned release.
complexity of the eligibility criteria for the various mechanisms might
appear excessive, and invite public criticism or even ridicule. For
example, a risk reduction sentence may have applied to someone
convicted of a violent class B felony such as second-degree intentional
homicide but not to someone who interfered with a police GPS device
203
(an offense specifically excluded by the statute). Third, the ability of
the judge to veto some earned release decisions meant that someone
200. See Harcourt, supra note 12 (manuscript at 2, 9).
201. EISENBERG ET AL., supra note 194, at 25; E-mail from Anthony Streveler, supra
note 16.
202. The risk reduction sentence statute did not apply to those convicted of various
offenses, many of them violent, such as kidnapping and reckless homicide, but it still applied
to many violent offenders. WIS. STAT. § 973.031 (2009–2010), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38,
§ 92. “Certain early release” was only available for inmates convicted of nonviolent offenses,
and as a further precaution, the prison social worker or extended supervision agent must have
had a “reason to believe” that the offender would not engage in assaultive activity in the
community. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. PAT-A earned release at 67% of the
sentence was only available to those convicted of misdemeanors and certain nonviolent
felonies, and those convicted of sex offenses and certain other offenses were ineligible. PATB earned release allowed inmates convicted of violent offenses and certain nonviolent
offenses to be released up to 25% earned. WIS. STAT. § 304.06(1)(bg)(1) (2009–2010),
repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 58. As with PAT-A, those convicted of sexual and other
specified offenses were ineligible. Id. PAT-C release was available for those convicted of
more serious felonies, including violent offenses, but many offenses, including certain violent
and sex offenses, were excluded. Id. § 304.06(1)(bg)(2), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 58.
Thus, violent offenders are often ineligible for earned release, and when they are, they cannot
gain release as early as nonviolent offenders.
203. WIS. STAT. § 973.031 (2009–2010), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 92 (excluding
those convicted of WIS. STAT. § 946.465, which prohibits tampering with GPS devices). As
Judge Richard Sankovitz noted, “The list of exceptions is peculiar and may be subject to
change with future legislation. For example, [Risk Reduction Sentences] sentencing is not
available in second degree homicide cases, but it is available in first degree homicide cases.”
Richard J. Sankovitz, Sentencing Toolbox Department Q&A: Risk Reduction Sentences,
THIRD BRANCH, Winter 2010, at 6, 6, available at http://www.wicourts.gov/news/thirdbranch
/docs/winter10.pdf.
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accountable to communities has a role in the decision. As noted above,
this may result in extra attention being paid to the release of violent or
other serious offenders, perhaps reducing the number of released
offenders who commit serious crimes.
While these features cannot prevent earned release from causing any
public safety problems, the fact that there were numerous measures in
place to protect public safety could have potentially blunted the public
reaction to particular incidents of releasees committing serious crimes.
As it happened, the 2011 repeal of most of the 2009 earned release
mechanisms did not seem to be stimulated by any particular event (such
as a releasee committing a terrible crime), but rather by the political
204
As discussed in Part III.B below,
preferences of new officeholders.
ensuring that earned release is compatible with public safety is a core
principle for successfully implementing earned release, and treating
violent offenders differently than nonviolent offenders is one potentially
defensible way to do this.
4. Addressing Reentry and Revocations
A final positive element in the 2009 legislation was the introduction
of three measures (only one of which was repealed in 2011) to reduce
recidivism and revocations from probation or extended supervision.
These include mechanisms allowing for earned release from community
205
supervision sentences, requirements that the DOC work to lower
206
revocation rates, and the establishment of the Council on Offender
207
Reentry. The availability of new funding for some of this work is a
positive sign, but implementation remains uncertain.
First, as described in Part II, a judge can discharge an offender from
probation if the offender has successfully completed half of the
probation term, and from 2009 to 2011, the DOC could unilaterally
208
release offenders from either probation or extended supervision. Such
policies are potentially very significant because the majority of prisoners
204. See supra note 57–59 and accompanying text.
205. 2009 Wis. Act 28, § 2666 (amending Wis. Stat. § 301.03(3) (2009–2010)).
206. 2009 Wis. Act 28, § 2669h (creating WIS. STAT. § 301.068 (2009–2010), which
establishes community services to reduce recidivism).
207. 2009 Wis. Act 28, §§ 34(g) (creating WIS. STAT. § 15.145 (2009–2010), which
describes the Council); 2009 Wis. Act 28, § 2669k (creating WIS. STAT. § 301.095, which
establishes the function of the Council).
208. WIS. STAT. § 973.01(4m) (2009–2010), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38 § 90; WIS.
STAT. § 973.09(3)(d) (2009–2010), amended by 2011 Wis. Act 38 § 93b.
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entering Wisconsin state prisons have been revoked from probation or
extended supervision for technical violations, rather than for committing
209
a new offense. The longer the period of supervision, the more likely
210
When offenders have successfully
technical violations are to occur.
completed a large proportion of their supervision sentence and the
judge or administrative decision-maker believes them to be a low public
safety risk, it is appropriate to shorten their sentences. Besides allowing
community corrections resources to be spent on higher-priority
offenders, modifying these sentences should reduce the prison
population by lowering the number of revocations. Since 2009, the
DOC has discharged at least sixty-five offenders from extended
supervision (parole) and twenty-two from probation, resulting in an
211
This is not an
overall reduction of 145 years of supervision.
overwhelming amount, but it indicates the DOC’s willingness to
implement this earned release policy.
Second, the 2009 legislation requires the DOC to provide training
and skill development to community corrections officers with the goal of

209. “Dr. Tony Fabelo, Director of Research, Justice Reinvestment Initiative, CSG
Justice Center . . . reported that [Wisconsin] revocations without a new sentence accounted
for 50% of prison admissions in 2000 and 61% of admissions in 2007.” WIS. LEGIS. COUNCIL,
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE REINVESTMENT INITIATIVE OVERSIGHT 6 (2010),
available at http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lc/publications/rl/rl_2009_12_jrio.pdf; see also BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: PROBATION AND PAROLE VIOLATORS IN STATE
PRISONS, 1991, at 2 (1995) (defining a technical violation as any violation of the conditions of
parole other than a new conviction for a criminal offense); COUNCIL OF STATE
GOVERNMENTS JUSTICE CENTER, JUSTICE REINVESTMENT IN WISCONSIN ANALYSES &
POLICY OPTIONS TO REDUCE SPENDING ON CORRECTIONS AND INCREASE PUBLIC SAFETY
4 (2009), available at http://nicic.gov/Library/023753 (“Between 2000 and 2007, the number of
people admitted to prison [in Wisconsin] who did not comply with the conditions of their
community supervision increased 40 percent. The number of people admitted to prison who
committed new offenses, however, decreased 11 percent.”); Todd R. Clear and James Austin,
Reducing Mass Incarceration: Implications of the Iron Law of Prison Populations, 3
HARVARD L. & POL’Y REV. 307, 317–18 (2009) (arguing that technical revocations could be
eliminated with “minimal public safety implications” by employing alternative sanctions for
rule violations).
210. David E. Olson & Arthur J. Lurigio, Predicting Probation Outcomes: Factors
Associated with Probation Rearrest, Revocations, and Technical Violations During
Supervision, 2 JUST. RES. & POL’Y 73, 82 (2000) (using Illinois probation data to show that
“sentence length was a predictor of probation revocation and technical violations but not of
new arrests”).
211. E-mail from Anthony Streveler, Wis. Dep’t of Corr. (Dec. 5, 2011). The
Department of Corrections calculated that these releases reduced total supervision by 53,071
days, which is over 145 years. Id.
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reducing recidivism and reducing the overall revocation rate.212 The
Department appears to have succeeded in reducing revocation rates at
213
least somewhat over the last two years. However, the 2009 budget did
not initially allocate additional resources to implement this statute, and
the legislation does not specify exactly what the department must do,
214
other than report on its progress.
This said, a ten-million dollar fund, “Becky Young Community
215
Corrections” fund, was finalized by the state government in 2010.
These funds will make possible a variety of new programs and
initiatives, including the statutorily-mandated efforts to reduce
revocations. Implementation so far has already resulted in the hiring of
employment coordinators to help those on probation or extended
supervision to find employment, additional staff to evaluate the
effectiveness of programs, new vocational training for inmates, and
216
expanded mental health services for offenders.
The legislature passed a version of the bill setting a goal of reducing
the revocation rate by 25%, but then-Governor Doyle vetoed this
217
Without a definite goal or specific directions, the fate of
provision.
this provision depends on the ingenuity and sustained attention of the
DOC. Ideally, the vast savings that could result from substantially
reducing revocations would motivate the department to aggressively
implement this statutory mandate. But no one should assume this will
occur. Notably, the process of requesting the Becky Young funds
requires the department to create a comprehensive plan for its
implementation of the new community corrections legislation, which

212. 2009 WIS. Act 28, § 2669h (creating WIS. STAT. § 301.068 (2009–2010), dealing with
community services aimed at reducing recidivism and specifically § 301.068(5), which required
the Department of Corrections to provide training to probation, parole, and extended
supervision agents).
213. E-mail from Anthony Streveler, supra note 16 (explaining that overall revocation
rates have been falling, and sending internal data showing lower rates of revocations over the
past two years for women).
214. 2009 Wis. Act 28, § 2669h (creating WIS. STAT. § 301.068(6) (2009–2010), which was
vetoed in part to remove the specific 25% reduction in recidivism goal).
215. Press Release, Lena Taylor, Taylor Applauds Final Approval of Becky Young
Community Justice Funds: Bi-partisan Investment in Reducing Recidivism Caps Work on
Corrections Reform (Mar. 16, 2010), http://www.legis.wi.gov/senate/sen04/news/Press/2010/pr
2010-014.asp.
216. WIS. DEP’T OF CORR., BECKY YOUNG COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS RECIDIVISM
REDUCTION STATUS FY 2011 REPORT 2, 5–6 (Jul. 14, 2010).
217. 2009 Wis. Act 28, § 2669(h); WIS. STAT. § 301.068.
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may serve to focus the department’s efforts.218 There was no such plan,
in contrast, for the implementation of the other earned release and
sentencing reforms under TIS-III.
Third, the 2009 legislation established a Council on Offender
219
Reentry, which is to coordinate reentry programs throughout the state.
The legislation requires the council to investigate potential funding
sources for reentry initiatives, including federal funds; to promote
collaboration and coordination among different agencies and non-state
entities relating to offender reentry; to encourage public input and
participation; to promote research and evaluation of reentry programs;
and to review existing reentry programs to ensure there is evidence they
220
are effective. The federal government has already awarded the state a
221
If the Council focuses on
$1.5 million grant for reentry initiatives.
achieving all of its goals, as opposed to focusing mainly on how to secure
federal grants, it could help reduce recidivism and revocations (and thus
the prison population) by expanding reentry efforts and improving their
effectiveness. However, there is no indication yet how active this
council will be, and virtually no information about its activities is
available to the public. Unfortunately, the Council did not meet for the
222
first time until December 2010, over a year after the legislation passed.
These three developments all represent ways for the state to reduce
revocations and recidivism through the better use of correctional
resources in the community. As discussed below in Part III.B.4, such
strategies should be a key element accompanying any earned release
reform, because of their potential to cut corrections costs and reduce
prison populations in ways consistent with public safety. However,
effective implementation of these three provisions is not guaranteed.

218. Interview with Anthony Streveler May, supra note 189.
219. 2009 Wis. Act 28, § 34g (creating WIS. STAT. § 15.145(5) (2009–2010), establishing
the Council on Offender Reentry); 2009 Wis. Act 28, § 2669k (creating WIS. STAT. § 301.095
(2009–2010), describing the duties of the Council on Offender Reentry).
220. 2009 Wis. Act 28, § 2669k (creating WIS. STAT. § 301.095 (2009–2010)).
221. Wisconsin Department of Corrections, Department-Wide Transfer Announcement,
Program & Policy Analyst: Advanced Second Chance Act Coordinator (Sept. 2010)
http://www.wi-doc.com/Employment_pdf/Transfer%20PPA%20Adv%209%
2010%20DEPT.pdf.
222. E-mail from Anthony Streveler, Wis. Dep’t of Corr. (Jan. 17, 2011) (indicating that
the Council did not meet until December 2010); 2009 Wis. Act 28. The opinions expressed
here are mine, not Mr. Streveler’s.
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As discussed below, ongoing, organized efforts are needed to ensure
223
implementation.
5. Multiplying Mechanisms
One potential disadvantage of Wisconsin’s earned release system is
the multiplication and frequent alteration of earned released
mechanisms over time. After Act 28 went into effect in 2009, there were
no fewer than ten earned release mechanisms applying to at least some
224
It seems likely a smaller number of mechanisms would
offenders.
cause less confusion (and lead to less litigation on the nature of the
mechanisms and their interrelationships with one another). At the same
time, the large number of mechanisms might have salutary effects by
broadening the availability of earned release and increasing the chances
that one of the mechanisms will be effective. Regardless, the topsyturvy history of earned release over the past decade and a half also
compounds the problem of complexity by potentially reducing actors’
confidence in the permanence of the mechanisms.
Obviously, there is something to be said for simplicity. Simple
legislation—creating a smaller number of mechanisms giving decisionmakers ample discretion—would be far less confusing to inmates,
judges, lawyers, and prison officials, and require less (if any) litigation to
clarify. Creating numerous and complex earned release mechanisms
may cause interaction and compatibility problems, potentially
necessitating expensive litigation and a prolonged rule-making process.
However, it is possible that establishing numerous earned release
mechanisms could have beneficial results. For example, the large
number of mechanisms means that more inmates are eligible, and may
give many inmates more than one chance at earned release. It also
allows mechanisms to be tailored to particular classes of inmates—for
example, ERRC release was presumably designed to make it easier for
TIS-I and TIS-II inmates to achieve release than under the original
225
It certainly worked: 469
judicial version of sentence adjustment.
inmates were released through ERRC release from 2009 to its repeal in
226
2011, accounting for 75% of the total earned releases during that time.

223. Infra Part III.A.6.
224. See 2009 Wis. Act 28, §§ 2703–12 (creating WIS. STAT. § 302.05, which outlined the
earned release program).
225. See supra Part II.C.
226. E-mail from Anthony Streveler Nov., supra note 188.
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Moreover, the more mechanisms there are, the more likely it is that
one of them will actually work, and succeed in releasing a sizable
number of inmates without public safety incidents. For example, if the
additional programming needed for the implementation of certain
mechanisms never materializes, or if judges fail to make inmates eligible
for risk reduction sentences or program-based release, officials could
227
If one mechanism turns out to be most
rely on other mechanisms.
effective in releasing individuals who do not recidivate, the legislature
could abolish the other mechanisms, benefitting from the quasi228
experimental nature of the multiple mechanisms.
Finally, when there are a large number of mechanisms, then even
when political winds shift, politicians wishing to appear tough on crime
may abolish some of the mechanisms but not others, allowing earned
release to continue at a similar pace. In fact, though current Republican
Governor Scott Walker promised to repeal the new earned release
legislation, he did not repeal all of it: eligibility for compassionate
release based on an “extraordinary health condition” and earned release
from probation (two 2009 reforms) remain in force, as does judicial
229
sentence adjustment.
Another problem is that, viewed over time, Wisconsin’s multipronged earned release system may seem like an ever-shifting mess,
which could undermine confidence in the system and create uncertainty
about the future. To review, Wisconsin long had an indeterminate
sentencing system, featuring sentence credit and parole release, both of
230
which the legislature abolished in 2000. From 2000 to 2003, truth-insentencing (TIS-I) was in full force, but the legislature failed to pass the
earned release mechanisms that had been expected to accompany truth-

227. For example, under the reforms in place from 2009–2011, even if the judge did not
sentence an offender to a risk reduction sentence, he or she could be released through
positive adjustment time. See supra notes 94, 111 and accompanying text.
228. Ideally a similar process would occur on a larger scale, in which earned release
mechanisms that have been shown to be effective in some states would be adopted and
further improved in other jurisdictions. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A
Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 403–04 (1998)
(explaining a philosophy of law and governance centering on local units free to innovate in
pursuit of common objectives, drawing on good practices from other units).
229. See supra note 58 and accompanying text; WIS. STAT. § 302.113(9g)(b) (2009–2010)
(compassionate release); WIS. STAT. § 973.09(3)(d) (2009–2010) (earned release from
probation); WIS. STAT. § 973.195(1r) (2009–2010) (sentence adjustment).
230. See supra Part II.B.
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in-sentencing.231 This meant a dramatic change from indeterminate
sentencing to one of the most restrictive truth-in-sentencing regimes in
232
the country.
In 2003, inaugurating TIS-II, the legislature finally passed several
earned release mechanisms, all of them vesting power mainly in trial
233
However, this did not settle matters; considerable
court judges.
litigation was necessary to determine various questions about the
234
legislation, such as its application to TIS-I inmates. During this time, a
Wisconsin Law Review article described the state’s truth-in-sentencing
235
law as “ambiguous,” “confusing,” and “inchoate,” and Meredith Ross,
the director of the Frank J. Remington Center, a legal clinic serving
prisoners, observed that the “law governing sentence modification and
236
earned release is a mess.”
As if matters were not confusing enough, in 2009 the legislature,
through its TIS-III legislation, began phasing out the main TIS-II earned
release mechanism (sentence adjustment), created several new earned
release mechanisms, restored sentence credit, and vested power in
administrative officials for nearly all earned release mechanisms, while
237
reducing or eliminating the judicial role. Then, merely two years later
in 2011, the Walker administration turned this all on its head,
establishing the fifth sentencing era in less than twelve years, by
abolishing most of the 2009 mechanisms and vesting almost all the
238
earned release authority in judges.

231. State v. Trujillo, 2005 WI 45, ¶ 33, 279 Wis. 2d 712, 694 N.W.2d 933 (Abrahamson,
C.J., dissenting) (noting that the “undisputed history of TIS-I and TIS-II” shows that “the
legislature did not intend TIS-I to go into effect until TIS-II was adopted with reduced
penalties”).
232. See supra Part II.B.
233. See supra Part II.B.
234. Mayrack, supra note 44, at 194 (citing State v. Stenklyft, 2005 WI 71, 281 Wis. 2d
484, 697 N.W.2d 769; State v. Tucker, 2005 WI 46, 279 Wis. 2d 697, 694 N.W.2d 926; Trujillo,
2005 WI 45, 279 Wis. 2d 712, 694 N.W.2d 933).
235. Id. at 194.
236. Ross, supra note 42, at 13.
237. See supra Part II.C.
238. See, e.g., 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 45 (amending WIS. STAT. § 302.113(9g) (2009–2010)
(giving the court the authority to review the department’s determination that an inmate is
eligible for release due to an extraordinary health condition and hold a hearing to determine
if release is in the public interest)); 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 93b (amending WIS. STAT.
§ 973.08(3)(d)(intro.) (2009–2010) (giving the sentencing court the sole authority to discharge
someone from probation early); see supra notes 134–135.
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All four of these transitions were rather abrupt and dramatic. Given
this turbulent history, inmates, judges, lawyers, and lawmakers may be
reluctant to invest too much time or resources in whatever earned
release mechanisms exist, if they expect the legislature to change
everything within a few years anyway.
To avoid these problems, states should carefully consider the timing
and content of legislative changes. It is inadvisable to pass historic
sentencing reforms while delaying accompanying legislation: in
Wisconsin, this created a uniquely harsh system, drove steep increases in
239
imprisonment, and fostered litigation. States should try to ensure that
the mechanisms they choose to establish are sustainable in the long term
and have clearly defined relationships to one another. States may want
to consider a simple earned release system with a small number of
mechanisms, which gives the relevant actors discretion that is
appropriately guided but not with such complexity that implementation
becomes problematic. For example, a state may choose to establish a
broad compassionate release statute, a sentence credit mechanism
allowing the sentence to be reduced as much as 25% for good behavior,
and a parole-like mechanism permitting an additional reduction of as
much as 25%.
6. Uneven Implementation
One problem with the various earned release mechanisms created in
2009 was their uneven implementation. As noted earlier, about seventyfive percent of earned releases from 2009 to 2011 occurred through a
240
The three types of positive
single mechanism (ERRC release).
adjustment time—PAT-A, PAT-B, and PAT-C—were applied to two,
241
fifty-four, and thirty-nine inmates, respectively. Ironically, those nonviolent offenders the legislature indicated were most deserving of
release—those eligible for PAT-A, or one day off for each two days of
242
Fifty-four of
good behavior—were actually released the least often.
the total releases were through “certain” earned release, about nine
243
percent of the total. Program-based release accounted for forty-two of
239. See supra Part II.B.
240. See supra Part II.C.3.
241. See supra Part II.C.3.
242. E-mail from Anthony Streveler Nov., supra note 188. This discrepancy was
possibly due to the fact that the Department of Corrections secretary, and not the ERRC as
with PAT-B and PAT-C, had decision-making authority for PAT-A releases.
243. Id.
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the releases.244 Not a single inmate was released through a risk reduction
245
sentence.
What is perhaps the most disappointing is that only four inmates
have been released through the new compassionate release provisions, a
246
It is
small fraction of the thirty to fifty inmates who die each year.
possible that many of these inmates died unexpectedly, were ineligible
for compassionate release, or remained potentially dangerous to the
public up to their last day. Yet it seems possible that at least some of
these inmates would have been eligible for compassionate release and
would have posed no public safety risk. If this is the case, releasing
them earlier could have saved the state large sums in medical bills and
allowed the prisoners more dignified and comfortable deaths. In Part
III.B.2 below, I discuss how policymakers can prevent potential
implementation problems.
7. The Need for Additional Resources and Judicial Education
Two final issues with Wisconsin’s 2009 earned release forms were
the state’s slowness in devoting the additional resources needed to
implement earned release effectively and at least minor problems with
educating and communicating with judges about the mechanisms. While
the Becky Young funds will allow additional resources to be spent on
community corrections (including for the goal of reducing revocations),
new resources may also be needed for prison programs. Judicial
education may have been lacking as the measures first went into effect,
247
but subsequent efforts appear to have been adequate.
Additional financial resources would probably have been necessary
for the measures to fully succeed, because some of the mechanisms,
particularly the risk reduction sentence, required the inmate to have
248
completed certain programming. Since prison programs were already
spread thin among the prison population, an expansion of programs was

244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.; see supra note 188 and accompanying text. I should note that while Mr.
Streveler provided me with this data, the opinions expressed here about implementation are
mine alone.
247. Interview with Anthony Streveler May, supra note 189.
248. 2009 Wis. Act 28, § 2699m (creating WIS. STAT. § 302.042 (2009–2010), describing
the Risk Reduction Program).
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needed.249 The failure of the legislature to enhance the budget for prison
programs calls into question the viability of these mechanisms.
Three considerations, however, may have reduced the seriousness of
this issue. First, under the Risk Reduction Sentence, the DOC had
complete discretion regarding what programs to include in an inmate’s
250
individual plan, and the flexibility to alter it at any time. This could
have allowed the inmates to complete their plans and achieve release
through the Risk Reduction Sentence, though hopefully not by forgoing
251
programming necessary for reducing the inmate’s risk to the public.
Second, in many cases inmates would have been eligible for release
through Positive Adjustment Time, which did not explicitly require
certain programming, at the same time as they were eligible for release
252
through the Risk Reduction Sentence. Third, the DOC has plans to
begin systematically applying the evidence-based principle, often
stressed by the Justice Center, that intensive resources and intervention
253
strategies should be directed toward the highest-risk offenders.
Despite the lack of new funds for prison programs, the application of
this principle could ensure that offenders most likely to commit
additional crimes or particularly serious crimes would have the highest
priority for programming.
Judicial education and outreach were important even for the 2009
reforms, because judges retain some role in several of the mechanisms.
In particular, for the risk reduction sentence, judges had to declare the
inmate eligible at sentencing. While there were some organized efforts
to educate judges about the new mechanisms, it is not obvious what
state officials would have told the judges, beyond explaining the details
254
The statute contains no hint about
of how the mechanisms work.

249. The DOC has the discretion to adjust an inmate’s treatment plan if necessary. See
Governor Jim Doyle, supra note 124, at 4 (“This partial veto preserves the intent of the
provision to direct the department to develop a program plan for the inmate that is designed
to reduce the risk of reoffending and allows for flexibility to modify the plan as needed.”).
However, the lack of additional programming could still have stalled earned release if the
DOC had been reluctant to alter treatment plans. If earned releases would have occurred
without necessary programming, because treatment plans were scaled back, this could have
threatened public safety.
250. WIS. STAT. § 302.042 (2009–2010).
251. Id.
252. See supra Part II.C.6–.7.
253. Interview with Anthony Streveler May, supra note 189.
254. Id. (indicating that the DOC had held several meetings with judges to discuss the
new earned release mechanisms).
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which inmates should be made eligible for the risk reduction sentence; it
only says that certain inmates are eligible, and that a judge must
255
sentence them to a risk reduction sentence for them to serve one.
Likewise, it was unclear when judges were supposed to exercise their
ability to hold hearings about releases under ERRC release or positive
adjustment time. The lack of guidance (particularly from the statutes
themselves) may have contributed to the sparse and uneven
256
implementation of these mechanisms.
More broadly, the earned release authorities must cultivate a
relationship with the state’s judiciary for the mechanisms to be
implemented smoothly. Soon after the reforms were passed, prison
officials told inmates to send letters to the judge requesting to be made
eligible for program-based release mechanisms that were newly open to
257
certain inmates. The problem is that there is uncertain legal authority
for judges to review such letters. Not only are the letters ex parte, and
potentially contrary to legislative intent, but they would presumably
need to be presented as (or interpreted as) sentence modification
258
If the DOC had
motions for judges to respond to them.
communicated with judges prior to instructing the inmates to write
letters, judges and inmates alike could have been spared from
considerable confusion and waste of time.
All of this said, it is not surprising that, in tough budgetary times,
new spending for prison programs was unavailable, and overall, judicial
259
The point here is that
education efforts were probably sufficient.
states need to plan in advance for these elements of the implementation
process. In the portion on general principles below in Part III.B, these
issues are identified as two important tasks, among others, for
policymakers to accomplish to ensure that earned release actually
results in significant numbers of inmates being released.
This Part, in its preliminary evaluation of Wisconsin’s earned release
mechanisms, has identified both positive aspects of and issues of
concern with the 2009 and 2011 earned release legislation.
255. WIS. STAT. § 973.031(2009–2010), repealed by 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 92.
256. Perhaps judges will, as a matter of course, sentence nearly all eligible inmates to
risk reduction sentences. One judge claimed to have been doing exactly this: imposing a risk
reduction sentence whenever the inmate is statutorily eligible. Anonymous interview (2010).
257. Interview with Meredith Ross, supra note 108.
258. For an explanation of Wisconsin sentence modification law, see Norris, supra note
60.
259. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
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Encouragingly, the 2009 legislation took several steps to protect public
safety, reduced the judicial role while retaining a veto as a check on
state officials, and improved the applicability and workability of the
compassionate release statute. However, the mechanisms were overly
numerous and complex, the additional financial resources needed for
implementation did not appear (with the exception of community
corrections funds), and implementation was quite uneven. While the
2011 legislation reduced the number of mechanisms and retained some
positive aspects of the 2009 reforms, it inappropriately vested nearly all
the earned release authority with judges. Drawing on both these
experiences and additional sources, this Article next presents four
principles for the successful implementation of earned release at the
state level.
B. What States Should Do to Ensure the Effectiveness of Earned Release:
Four Principles
To ensure effectiveness in the broadest sense, earned release
legislation in any state should accomplish four main objectives. First, it
should provide for measurement and internal controls to make sure that
earned release does not cause injustice, such as by operating arbitrarily
or by deepening racial or other sentencing disparities. Second,
policymakers should engage in strategic, responsive governance so that
earned release results in a substantial number of inmates being released
earlier than would have occurred otherwise. Third, states should take
special care to prevent earned release mechanisms from endangering
public safety. Fourth, and most importantly for curtailing corrections
costs, states should accompany new earned release measures with other
policies aimed at reducing incarceration in ways consistent with public
safety.
1. Avoiding Injustice: Data Gathering and Structured Decision-Making
States should accomplish two important tasks to prevent earned
release mechanisms from fostering injustice. First, states should
monitor the implementation of earned release in a systematic,
transparent fashion, enabling any disparities or other problematic
results to be analyzed and corrected. Second, states should require
decision-makers to use a structured, principled methodology for making
and explaining earned release decisions, to avoid arbitrary decisions or
the development of overly narrow decision-making customs.
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a. Transparent Monitoring of the Implementation of Earned Release
The production of publicly available and reliable statistics on earned
release is essential for ensuring the fairness of the process.
Unfortunately, such data has not always been available in Wisconsin.
While data on the Act 28 earned release programs has been available,
no data was ever publicly available about judicial sentence modification.
Using non-public data sources I was able to discover, as noted briefly
above, that that the rate of approval of sentence adjustment petitions
varied dramatically by county, which may have reinforced racial
260
disparities. Such extreme geographic disparity is virtually certain to be
unjust, because it is simply too vast to be accounted for by the varying
261
details of the cases. If such data had been made public, it could have
been used by judges, defense attorneys, or policymakers to reduce some
262
of this disparity. For example, if judges had had access to information
about approval rates in other counties and the types of cases receiving
sentence adjustment, this disparity might well have dissipated.
Specifically, judges who were reluctant to grant any sentence
adjustments might have started to grant them if they understood that
other judges had been doing so for years.
Presumably, Wisconsin’s geographic disparities in earned release
decisions at least somewhat diminished from 2009 to 2011, since
statewide administrative agencies were the main actors in charge of
earned release. This is because applying the same methodology to
prisoners across the state would be unlikely to result in earned release
being rarely granted to offenders in some counties but commonly
263
granted to offenders from elsewhere.
However, racial disparities are endemic within all stages of the
criminal justice system in the United States, and are in dire need of
264
attention. Wisconsin in particular has among the worst—or even the
very worst, depending on the measure—racial disparities in
265
It is important that all sentencing,
imprisonment in the country.
260. See supra notes 146–150 and accompanying text.
261. See id; see also Norris, supra note 38. As a matter of common sense, it is difficult to
believe that the objective situations of the inmates in the various counties were so different
that it was justified to virtually never grant sentence adjustments in some counties, while
granting nearly half of them in other counties.
262. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 248–49 and accompanying text.
264. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
265. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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earned release, and other criminal justice data be regularly compiled
and made public. The absence of publicly available data severely limits
the ability of citizens and policymakers to respond to disparities and
other problems that exist.
This issue is particularly important given Professor Harcourt’s
compelling argument that the increased use of risk assessment
266
This
instruments in earned release may reinforce racial disparities.
effect could occur because minorities will often have a larger number of
previous offenses, caused, in part, by heavier policing and drug
enforcement in inner cities (despite the fact that different racial groups
267
Because of the inherent
use and sell illegal drugs at similar rates).
unfairness and drastic social consequences of racial disparities in the
criminal justice system, it is an urgent task for states to measure the
268
effects of their policies, including earned release, on racial disparities.
However, preliminary data indicates that the 2009 expansion of earned
release did not increase disparities.
From 2009 to 2011, 666 inmates achieved earned release from
269
In reviewing these discretionary releases the
Wisconsin prisons.
department certainly consulted its newly validated risk assessment tool,
though it is unclear how much of a role it played in each release
decision. So far, these earned releases have not exacerbated racial
disparities. The releases between 2009 and 2011 were 44.5% black, and
270
the prison population during that time ranged from 43% to 44% black.
If anything, blacks have been slightly overrepresented in earned
releases. Hispanic inmates were also released at a rate virtually
271
equivalent to their proportion in the prison population.
266. See Harcourt, supra note 12 (manuscript at 2, 8–9).
267. Id.; Norris, supra note 38 (manuscript at 3–4); ALEXANDER, supra note 38, at 7;
(nothing that “[s]tudies show that people of all colors use and sell illegal drugs at remarkably
similar rates”).
268. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 38.
269. E-mail from Anthony Streveler, supra note 104.
270. This is based on data obtained from the Department of Corrections in January
2011. E-mail from Anthony Streveler, supra note 104.
271. E-mail from Anthony Streveler, supra note 104. The total number of releases—
including those released to another prison sentence being served consecutively—was 685. Id.
Eleven of the releasees were Native American, 3 were Asian or Pacific Islander, 302 were
white, and 64 were Hispanic. Id. On January 31, 2010, the inmate population was about 3%
Native American, 1% Asian/Pacific Islander, 43% African-American, 9% Hispanic, 44%
white, and 0.5% unknown. Id. In June 2009, the racial/ethnic breakdown had been nearly the
same, though with a slightly larger proportion of African-Americans: about 3% Native
American, 1% Asian/Pacific Islander, 44% black, 9% Hispanic, 0.5% unknown, and 44%
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The production and public availability of high-quality data on
earned release is an essential element of a successful earned release
system for any state. No state, and no stage in the criminal justice
process, is immune from racial disparities or other potential biases.
Only when state officials and the public have the relevant data can
progress occur. In addition, the availability of high-quality data on
earned release will also allow policymakers to measure the effects of the
policies—on such things as public safety, disparities, and prison
population—and adjust them accordingly.
b. Ensuring Principled, Recorded Decision-Making
Another critical method for ensuring fairness and avoiding injustice
is the enforcement of standards for principled decision-making. When
decision-makers must engage in and record an informed, structured
reasoning process, this reduces the appearance (and reality) of arbitrary
decision-making. This reasoning process can be informed by several
considerations: the permitted legal justifications for earned release, the
original purposes of the sentence, facts about the individual offender
and the environment into which he or she will be released, and the
results of risk assessment tools estimating the future chance of
recidivism. This model is informed by the rule-of-law sentencing
approach, which seeks to make sentencing decisions the product of a
reasoning process involving the application of a legal standard to facts,
as opposed to ad hoc, intuitive decisions or overly formulaic
272
determinations based on two-dimensional sentencing grids.

white. Id. Asian-Americans were slightly over-represented, and Native Americans slightly
under-represented, in earned releases, but given the small numbers involved, this could be
due to chance rather than systematic bias.
272. See generally Michael M. O’Hear, Appellate Review of Sentence Explanations:
Learning from the Wisconsin and Federal Experiences, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 751, 782–89 (2009)
[hereinafter O’Hear, Appellate Review] (presenting eleven rules for the explanation of
sentences that build on the similar approach based on Wisconsin case law); Smith & Dickey,
supra note 30, at 6–7 (expounding the rule-of-law approach); Michael E. Smith, Let
Specificity, Clarity, and Parsimony of Purpose Be Our Guide, 20 LAW & POL’Y 491 (1998).
Professor O’Hear also presents a cogent rationale for improving sentencing explanations,
based on evidence about procedural, substantive justice, transparency, and informationsharing benefits. O’Hear, Appellate Review, supra, at 753–62; see also Michael M. O’Hear,
Explaining Sentences, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 459, 479–80 (2009) [hereinafter O’Hear,
Explaining Sentences] (making the case for a robust requirement for judges to explain their
sentences, since the explanation process may attenuate the effect of common psychological
biases on judges and better predispose defendants for rehabilitation). For a similar
perspective that focuses on probation decision-making, see Wayne A. Logan, The Importance
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In rule-of-law sentencing, the judge begins by specifying which
statutorily approved sentencing objectives, such as public safety and just
273
Then
punishment, are of greatest importance to the particular case.
the judge considers various facts relevant to sentencing, such as
mitigating or aggravating factors; substance abuse, or other behavioral
or psychological issues; the availability of informal social control in the
community (such as family or work relationships); and the availability
274
Finally, the judge
and effectiveness of various potential sanctions.
uses these facts to reason about which punishments, and how much
275
punishment, would be needed to achieve the objectives of punishment.
Arguably state actors should engage in a similar process in their earned
release decisions, and should record their decision-making rationale, just
as judges do.
Besides enhancing fairness, measures to enforce a principled,
recorded reasoning process may add to the legitimacy, sustainability,
and effectiveness of earned release by increasing transparency and the
quality of the decisions, improving inmate conduct, and preventing
abuses of the earned release system. First, as Professor Klingele has
discussed, the lack of transparency in parole decisions was a main factor
276
in the large-scale abandonment of indeterminate sentencing.
Providing transparency through logically explained and publicly
available decisions may make earned release systems more acceptable
277
Second, when decisionto the public and, thus, more sustainable.
makers are forced to articulate a reasoning process they may make
decisions that are in greater accord with reality. Third, offenders who
perceive the decision-makers to have made a fair and reasoned decision
may be more motivated to improve their behavior and post-release plan,
because they may feel treated with respect and dignity, and believe that
the decision-makers will respond appropriately to improvements in the
278
As the psychological literature on
offender’s behavior or plans.

of Purpose in Probation Decision Making, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 171 (2003).
273. See Smith & Dickey, supra note 30, at 5–6.
274. See id. at 6–7.
275. Id. at 6. Smith and Dickey argue that public safety should always trump just
punishment if the objectives conflict. Id. Thus, an offender should receive a noncustodial
sentence if such a sentence is more consistent with public safety, even if the judge finds that
the inmate deserves a prison sentence. See id.
276. Klingele, Changing the Sentence, supra note 8, at 497–98.
277. See id.
278. See id. at 517.
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procedural justice has demonstrated, people react far more positively to
279
Fourth, employing a structured
adequately explained decisions.
reasoning process might make it more difficult to quickly release large
numbers of inmates, when doing so would be inconsistent with public
safety. Such a process would ensure that administrators individually
analyze each case, enabling them to identify those who pose a high risk.
Fifth, a required reasoning process could prevent earned release
authorities from developing institutional customs in which certain
relevant factors and not others are taken into account, or in which most
inmates are nearly always released within the same narrow window of
280
the percentage of time served.
Each component of the decision-making process is critical. First,
decision-makers should have access to the complete sentencing
281
transcript. If the judge determined that certain sentencing objectives
were more important than others, or that a certain condition (such as
drug treatment or restitution) was necessary to fulfill an objective,
decision-makers should take this into account. When the transcript is
not available to the decision-makers (who only know the final sentence
imposed), they are unable to abide by the sentencing judge’s intentions.
Second, decision-makers should consider the available facts about
the individual offender, including such things as aggravating and
mitigating factors in the original offense, institutional conduct, program
participation, post-release plans, and the availability of treatment and
282
Third, the decision-makers should
supervision in the community.
review the results of a scientifically validated risk assessment
279. See O’Hear, Explaining Sentences, supra note 272, at 479–80 (discussing procedural
justice research and arguing that well-explained sentences signals respect for defendants and,
thus, may encourage institutional adjustment and rehabilitation). Defendants who hear such
explanations may also be less likely to appeal the decisions to courts.
280. Of course, such customs could develop anyway, but a structured reasoning process
would at least create the opportunity for officials to take a broad range of factors into
consideration and tailor release decisions to each inmate’s situation.
281. O’Hear, Appellate Review, supra note 272, at 760 (“A thorough sentence
explanation creates a permanent record of what the judge found to be important about the
case and why. This information may be valuable in a number of respects.”). Obviously,
without the entire transcript, it would be impossible to evaluate the sentence explanation in
context.
282. Each of these could potentially inform decision-makers’ conclusions about (1)
whether the offender deserves earned release as a matter of justice and (2) whether releasing
the offender at that time poses a danger to the community. See Klingele, Early Demise, supra
note 9, at 452–56 & n.186 (discussing the need for clarity about the permissible reasons for
earned release).
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instrument, while being cautious in their interpretation of it. Decisionmakers should be familiar enough with the methodology of such
analyses to identify their weaknesses, and to know when they may be
283
less helpful. For example, when the model does not take into account
certain offense characteristics that are important for a particular case,
the decision-makers may give the risk assessment results less weight
than in other cases.
Fourth, decision-makers should have access to sentencing data,
allowing them to tell whether the offender’s sentence was unusually long
for the offense or how often they have released similar offenders in the
284
Access to such comparative data could promote greater
past.
285
When more than one decision-maker is involved in
consistency.
earned release, achieving some measure of consistency may be
impossible without access to such data.
Fifth, decision-makers need to structure their decisions with
reference to the permissible reasons for earned release, as explained in
statutes and case law. For example, several of the earned release
mechanisms that exist now or recently existed (sentence adjustment,
ERRC release, PAT-B, and PAT-C) allow or allowed earned release
283. For general reviews of the disadvantages of actuarial decision-making in criminal
justice, see BERNARD HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND
PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 109–92 (2007); Hannah-Moffat, supra note 11
(manuscript at 10–12); and Harcourt, supra note 12 (manuscript at 2, 8–9) (debating the
usefulness of risk assessment in earned release decisions).
284. Even if the sentence was particularly long for the offense, this does not necessarily
mean earned release authorities should release the inmate earlier. Particularly if the judge, in
the sentencing transcript, provided a rationale for the long sentence, it may be appropriate to
defer to the judge’s judgment and refrain from taking this issue into account. This is an
additional reason why it is important for decision-makers to have access to the full sentencing
transcript. More generally, access to sentencing data may allow earned release decisions to
correct, at least to some degree, disparities among sentences that are apparently unjustified.
285. See Marc L. Miller, A Map of Sentencing and a Compass for Judges: Sentencing
Information Systems, Transparency, and the Next Generation of Reform, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
1351, 1357–70 (2005) (discussing the need for sentencing data, and the potential of sentencing
information systems to fulfill this need for consistency). Decades ago, Judge Marvin Frankel
decried the “wild array of sentencing judgments without any semblance of the consistency
demanded by the ideal of equal justice.” MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES:
LAW WITHOUT ORDER 7 (1973). Without access to information about the sentences other
judges give for comparable offenses (or the earned releases granted to inmates with
comparable offenses, institutional behavior, and post-release plans), earned release may
suffer from similarly dramatic and unjustifiable variation. This said, it is possible to achieve
“excessive uniformity,” by demanding that cases similar in certain discrete ways be treated
identically (as has happened, to some degree, through mandatory minimum sentences). Marc
L. Miller, Sentencing Equality Pathology, 54 EMORY L.J. 271, 275–77 (2005).
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because of an inmate’s “conduct, efforts at and progress in
rehabilitation, or participation and progress in education, treatment, or
other correctional programs”; because the inmate is subject to a
sentence in another jurisdiction or is subject to deportation upon
release; or when earned release is “otherwise in the interests of
286
justice.” This last clause is particularly significant.
The “interests of justice” language gave the decision-maker (the
judge, the ERRC, or both, depending on the mechanism) broad
authority to reduce sentences for any defensible reason. This clause was
originally included in the TIS-II legislation allowing judges to reduce
287
sentences to 75% or 85% of the original sentence. The intent of the
clause was to give judges the freedom to grant sentence reductions
whenever justified, even if this involves merely reconsidering the
288
original facts of the case or the offender’s behavior while incarcerated.
This is in contrast to Wisconsin’s common law sentence modification
doctrine, which allows judges to alter sentences only because of facts
unknown at sentencing or that happened after sentencing, and forbids
judges from shortening sentences because of good behavior or
289
rehabilitation. Thus, the “interests of justice” language in the current
earned release mechanisms gives decision-makers virtually unhindered
discretion regarding the specific reasons for approving earned release.
For example, if an inmate were inexplicably sentenced to a longer
term than others with similar offense characteristics, or than a codefendant with equal or greater culpability, the decision-maker might
conclude that additional confinement is unnecessary to achieve deserved

286. WIS. STAT. §§ 973.195(1r)(b)(4)–(5) (2009–2010).
287. WIS. STAT. § 304.06(1)(bg)(3) (2009–2010) (allowing inmates whose crimes were
committed earlier than October 1, 2009, to petition the ERRC for release after serving 75%
of their sentence); id. § 304.06(1)(bg)(4) (allowing inmates whose crimes were committed
earlier than October 1, 2009, to petition the ERRC for release after serving 85% of their
sentence).
288. Professor Walter. J. Dickey, who participated in a committee drafting the sentence
adjustment statute, confirms that this was the committee’s intent. Under the committee’s
understanding of the statute, the judge can grant a sentence adjustment “in the interests of
justice” based solely on a reconsideration of the original facts of the case. Interview with
Walter J. Dickey, supra note 62.
289. State v. Kluck, 210 Wis. 2d 1, 7–8, 563 N.W.2d 468, 471 (1997); State v. Champion,
2002 WI App 267, ¶ 6, 258 Wis. 2d 781, 654 N.W.2d 242 (holding that rehabilitation did not
qualify as a new factor for TIS inmates, despite the fact that they are not eligible for parole,
because this would contradict the public policy behind truth-in-sentencing legislation); State
v. Krueger, 119 Wis. 2d 327, 335, 351 N.W.2d 738, 742 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984).
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punishment or public safety.290 Likewise, if the inmate provided
significant assistance to police after conviction, the authority may decide
that this weighs in favor of his earned release, either because it reduces
his likelihood of reoffending or because it indicates that a shorter
sentence would be more just. In this way, corrections officials may
choose to allow earned release even for reasons that would not normally
be considered, except perhaps by judges, in release decisions.
A critic might object that parole or corrections officials are not wellsuited for deciding what is just and unjust, given their lack of legal
training. However, these officials must nonetheless be trusted with such
decisions when authorized by statute. First, some elementary training
can give non-lawyer officials the tools they need to reason about justice
and the relationship between particular facts and the purposes of the
sentence. Second, it is worth pointing out that many have criticized
contemporary sentencing practices for being essentially lawless, rather
291
Reasoning
than the result of applying a legal standard to the facts.
through a sentencing or earned release decision does not come naturally
to anyone, but rather must be learned. Officials in such situations
should abide by the plain intent of the legislation, which in this case
clearly directed state officials to determine what is in the interests of
justice.
A general catch-all provision allowing release when “otherwise in
the interests of justice” is probably a useful and appropriate element of
earned release legislation for all states to consider. Such a provision can
prevent decision-makers from unduly narrowing their inquiry, and
ignoring facts that are relevant to the objectives of the sentence. As
long as decision-makers are trained to engage in a logical reasoning
process that considers all the relevant facts, purposes of the sentence,
and permitted grounds for release, there is little reason to think a catchall clause would be subject to abuse. The vast majority of decisions
would probably center around rehabilitation and post-release

290. The ERRC and the judge (and the DOC as well, which plays a role in many earned
release decisions) should have access to comparative data on the length of sentences. If the
offender was sentenced to a substantially longer term than others with the same offense and
characteristics, without explanation in the sentencing transcript or reasonable inferences that
would explain the discrepancy (for example, the presence of a particular aggravating factor),
then this should weigh in favor of release, since earned release would be in the interests of
justice. Of course, if public safety for some reason indicates that earned release is
inappropriate, this may trump more abstract considerations of injustice.
291. See Smith & Dickey, supra note 30, at 4–5.
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circumstances, with miscellaneous justice-related concerns appearing
relatively rarely.
In sum, officials should require decision-makers to explain and
record (with reference to the relevant law, facts, and objectives of the
sentence) the reasons for approving or denying an earned release
request. This requirement could increase the quality of decisionmaking, improve inmate conduct, increase the political legitimacy and
sustainability of earned release, keep decision-makers from
unnecessarily restricting the factors they consider, and prevent mass
292
releases that are not in the interest of public safety.
2. Ensuring Implementation Through Strategic Governance
For earned release legislation to fulfill its purpose, it must result in
significant numbers of inmates being released earlier than they would
have been otherwise. Yet the failure to make the necessary budgetary
and administrative changes may drastically curtail the effectiveness of
these mechanisms. If this occurs, very few inmates may be released,
rendering the legislation virtually worthless as means to cut corrections
spending and lower the prison population.
When states pass new earned release legislation, legislatures or state
agencies should commission studies that evaluate what preconditions
are necessary to ensure the earned release mechanisms actually
accomplish their goals. At least five elements should be considered:
programming requirements, judicial education, administrative obstacles,
collaborative planning, and limiting the number of veto points in
decision-making.
More generally, a commitment to strategic,
collaborative governance—involving planning, continual monitoring,
and responding in a timely way to obstacles as they arise—will enhance
the effectiveness of earned release mechanisms.
This principle
corresponds to recent sociological research detailing the weaknesses
293
existing in even quite sophisticated forms of governance.
For example, in the European Union (EU), in a governance process
known as the Open Method of Coordination, each country creates
292. For more detailed suggestions on how to implement rule-of-law sentencing, see
O’Hear, Explaining Sentences, supra note 272, at 479 (developing proposals for further
requirements to explain sentences).
293. Jesse J. Norris, From Ballymun to Brussels: Forms of Partnership Governance in
Irish Social Inclusion Policy, in IRISH BUSINESS AND SOCIETY: GOVERNING,
PARTICIPATING & TRANSFORMING IN THE 21ST CENTURY 296, 303–04 (John Logan et al.
eds., 2010).
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comprehensive analyses of the weaknesses of its social protection
systems, detailed strategic plans for new policies that would remedy
these weaknesses, and implementation reports detailing each country’s
294
progress in each policy area. These documents are regularly evaluated
by the European Commission and other member states, in terms of
295
common objectives agreed to by all countries. Similar processes exist
at the country level, with each municipality creating its own strategic
296
While this collaborative
plans for improving various policy areas.
approach has had many positive effects, constant attention is still
297
necessary to ensure positive results.
In particular, as my own research on EU anti-poverty and
employment policy has demonstrated, central government actors are
often insufficiently responsive to the problems of implementation as
298
they occur on the ground. This is true even in systems self-consciously
designed by policymakers to establish a more collaborative and effective
299
mode of governance.
While specific approaches to reform vary, many observers now agree
that effectively implementing ambitious government policies
necessitates a strong commitment to good governance, involving
strategic planning, cross-sectoral collaboration, non-state participation,
regular empirical evaluations, independent monitoring, and
300
While the influence of such ideas is spreading, state
transparency.
governments are inconsistent in their approach to strategic

294. Jonathan Zeitlin, The Open Method of Coordination in Question, in THE OPEN
METHOD OF COORDINATION IN ACTION: THE EUROPEAN EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL
INCLUSION STRATEGIES 19, 19–21 (Jonathan Zeitlin & Phillipe Pochet eds., 2005)
[hereinafter THE OPEN METHOD OF COORDINATION] (outlining the structure of the OMC);
see also Social Protection & Social Inclusion, EUROPEAN COMM’N: EMPL’T, SOC. AFFAIRS
AND INCLUSION, available at http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=750&langId=en (last
visited June 1, 2012) (providing a brief overview of the present OMC system with regard to
social protection and social inclusion).
295. Zeitlin, supra note 294, at 21.
296. Norris, supra note 293 at 301.
297. See id. at 303–04.
298. See id.
299. See id. at 299–300.
300. See LAURA EDGAR, CLAIRE MARSHALL AND MICHAEL BASSETT,
PARTNERSHIPS: PUTTING GOOD GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES IN PRACTICE 5–6 (2006),
available at http://lin.ca/Files/11119/2006_partnerships.pdf (listing principles of good
governance); Tony Bovaird & Elke Löffler, Evaluating the Quality of Public Governance:
Indicators, Models and Methodologies, 69 INT’L REV. ADMIN. SCI. 313, 322 (2003) (noting
prevalence of good governance paradigm).
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governance.301 Generally, state-level governance systems in the United
States are far less advanced than these European processes. For
example, nothing resembling the Open Method of Coordination exists,
and even basic strategic plans outlining the government’s intentions for
302
Given this
policy implementation are done relatively infrequently.
context, how can states effectively implement earned release policies
while avoiding common governance problems? While a comprehensive
analysis is not possible here, addressing five key issues can help states
implement earned release effectively.
First, when earned release mechanisms require program completion
before release, states should assess whether additional resources need to
be devoted to these programs. If additional resources are necessary but
are not available, inmates who could have gained earned release
through the mechanisms may not be able to enroll in and complete the
303
programming in time.
Second, when judges play an important role in earned release,
policymakers need to engage in a well-organized effort to educate them
and other relevant actors about these mechanisms. This should go
beyond mere education about the mechanisms, instead providing judges
with detailed information relevant to earned release (and sentencing
more broadly), and with opportunities for involvement at various levels
in any criminal justice reform. In fact, as argued in Part III.C below,
judicial education and more general judicial involvement in criminal
justice reform may be critical to the elusive task of bringing the rule of
law to sentencing.
Third, states must also address potential obstacles within states
agencies to ensure implementation proceeds smoothly. As shown in a
recent New York Times report and a Vera Institute study on
compassionate release statutes in various states, few people have been
released through these statutes, despite the large numbers of eligible
301. One indication that the influence of these ideas is spreading is the popularity in law
review articles of the “democratic experimentalist” approach originally articulated by Charles
Sabel and Michael Dorf. See generally Dorf & Sabel, supra note 228. Indeed, a Westlaw
Next search for “democratic /2 experimentalism” yields over 600 secondary sources.
302. As noted below, there was no strategic plan for implementing Act 28 earned release
mechanisms, though such a plan did exist with regard to the Becky Young funds. While
nothing like the OMC exists in the United States, non-profit organizations have sometimes
created something somewhat similar, by undergoing similar projects in several states. The
primary example here is the Justice Center of the Council of State Governments. See infra
notes 313–318 and accompanying text.
303. See supra Part III.A.7.
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inmates.304 If a state agency formally or informally creates internal rules
for the governance of earned release that, purposefully or not,
discourage earned release—or encourage earned release even when it
would endanger public safety—state policymakers need to respond to
305
such problems by working with the agencies to find solutions. Such an
observation may seem obvious, but state agencies often have problems
with being responsive in real time, as opposed to waiting until an
306
evaluation is commissioned to consider meaningful change. Similarly,
if certain procedures (such as a risk assessment instrument or the actual
process for an earned release mechanism) need to be developed to allow
for implementation, policymakers should ensure this occurs without
delay.
Moreover, when administrative personnel—perhaps accustomed to
the previously restrictive earned release regime—appear reluctant to
approve earned release requests, states must evaluate the situation and
decide whether replacing the personnel, retraining them, or changing
their incentives is necessary. Similar efforts may be necessary when
other relevant actors play a role in maintaining or increasing the prison
population, such as community supervision officers, who in some cases
may view a revocation and re-incarceration as a success rather than a
failure. More generally, having established channels for communicating
problems with on-the-ground implementation to higher policy-making
307
levels is important to ensure responsiveness.
An example of a constructive approach to overcoming institutional
obstacles occurred in Milwaukee in 2010. The Milwaukee Police Chief
was concerned that the new earned release programs would endanger

304. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
305. As an example, “certain early release” sounds relatively simple on paper, but the
DOC made it into a multi-step process that took so long and put so many people’s
reputations on the line that it may have discouraged the use of this mechanism. Specifically,
the proposed release was first sent to the social worker for evaluation, then the extended
supervision agent, then the director of community supervision, and finally to the Secretary of
Corrections. Interview with Meredith Ross, supra note 108.
306. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
307. This has been discussed elsewhere in terms of establishing “vertical co-ordination
mechanisms” for communication between different levels of administration, from lower-level
government staff to mid-level administrators to national policymakers. See Norris, supra note
293, at 312; see also Jonathan Zeitlin, The Open Method of Coordination in Action:
Theoretical Promise, Empirical Realities, Reform Strategy, in THE OPEN METHOD OF
COORDINATION, supra note 294, at 447, 458.
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his efforts to reduce crime in the city.308 During meetings between
Milwaukee Police and DOC staff, the two sides worked out a plan to
309
This involved
avoid public safety problems related to releasees.
reallocating community corrections agents to ensure that those released
310
In
are closely monitored, including after normal working hours.
addition, they agreed to increase information sharing between the police
311
and the DOC, to facilitate the reentry of offenders into society.
This example illustrates how policymakers can overcome
institutional obstacles. Collaborative problem-solving between the two
agencies improved communication, breaking down institutional barriers.
Without these meetings, the police might have become zealous
opponents of earned release—for example, they might have spoken at
court hearings to oppose earned release decisions.
Fourth, it is important for actors involved in implementation to
participate in a collaborative, transparent planning process. This would
involve the creation of publicly available, regularly updated strategic
plans detailing the planned implementation of the earned release
mechanisms (and other related reforms where applicable), the
systematic consultation of other agencies and non-state individuals and
entities, and the actual implementation of the plans. Another important
element would be a broad-based implementation committee, including
representatives from the ERRC, different agencies within the DOC, and
other state agencies involved in implementation (such as local social
services and police). This committee, which could include judges,
victims’ rights advocates, community members, and perhaps even
former inmates, would meet regularly to exchange information, monitor
312
implementation, and make suggestions for change.
Finally, states should consider carefully the design of their legislation
or regulation, including whether the decision-making process gives too
308. Scott Bauer, Prison Release Gets a Second Look—Nonviolent Inmates Let Out to
Cut Costs, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, May 5, 2010, at B3; News: Chief: Prisoners’ Release May
Impact Crime Rate (WISN television broadcast Jan. 21, 2010), available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vKDl4oqYRP0.
309. Bauer, supra note 308.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Such a committee might resemble a more specific and focused version of criminal
justice councils. These councils, such as the Milwaukee County Criminal Justice Council,
involve collaboration among a number of stakeholders dedicated to improving the
effectiveness of the criminal justice system. See generally Alan J. Borsuk, Get Smart?, MARQ.
LAW., Fall 2011, at 20.
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many actors veto power over earned release decisions. It may make
sense to give more than one actor a role in the process, perhaps to avoid
unwise decisions made by a single actor who feels pressure to release
inmates. However, the more veto points or bureaucratic hurdles that
exist, the more likely it is that the process will stall and rarely result in
release. If proper checks are placed on executive officials responsible
for earned release, such that there is little concern that they will abuse
their power by releasing too many inmates, then it may not be necessary
to allow other actors (such as judges) to veto their decisions.
Requirements to record and explain the reasoning process, and the use
of validated risk assessment instruments, might serve as sufficient
constraints on decision-makers.
In addition to these suggestions, the three-fold methodology of the
Justice Center of the Council for State Governments offers a promising
template for states to use in planning and implementing earned release
reforms. The Justice Center has overseen the implementation of this
strategy, at least partially, in several states (among them Kansas, Texas,
313
First, Justice Center experts analyze
Connecticut, and Wisconsin).
crime and criminal justice data, identify neighborhoods with large
numbers of people under supervision, document the need for additional
services and resources in these areas, and “develop[] practical, datadriven, and consensus-based policies that reduce spending on
314
corrections to reinvest in strategies that can improve public safety.”
Second, experts assist policymakers in effectively implementing the
policies, including by contributing to implementation plans and progress
315
reports. Third, the Justice Center ensures that policymakers regularly
receive updates on the new measures’ impacts on the prison population,
316
The focus of this strategy on reinvesting
recidivism, and crime.
resources in ways designed to increase public safety and measuring the
results of reforms is consistent with the thrust of this Article’s
recommendations.

313. Work in the States, COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR.,
http://justicereinvestment.org/states (last visited June 1, 2012).
314. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR., JUSTICE REINVESTMENT: A
DATA-DRIVEN APPROACH TO REDUCE CORRECTIONS SPENDING AND REINVEST SAVINGS
IN STRATEGIES THAT CAN DECREASE CRIME AND STRENGTHEN NEIGHBORHOODS 2
(2010), available at http://justicereinvestment.org/files/JR_Overview_2010.pdf.
315. Id.
316. Id.
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In sum, policymakers need to consider—while drafting legislation,
while planning for implementation, and during implementation itself—
whether everything is in place for the earned release mechanisms to
succeed in releasing significant numbers of inmates, while at the same
time avoiding harms to public safety. If additional correctional
resources are needed, such as rehabilitative programming or community
supervision, the state should be prepared to provide them as soon as
they are needed. Policymakers should systematically educate, and
remain in communication with judges and other relevant actors, to
ensure they understand how to play their part in implementing the
mechanisms. When legislative, regulatory, or administrative factors
threaten the effectiveness of earned release programs, policymakers
should be ready to take action to remove these obstacles. The
formation of an ongoing implementation or monitoring committee, with
members from various interested government and non-government
entities, ideally with at least one full-time staff member, is an important
317
element in ensuring the effectiveness of earned release. Limiting the
number of veto points in earned release decision-making is another
method for preventing implementation problems. In any case, as
suggested by recent social science research, the key is to engage in a
continual process of strategic governance, monitoring implementation
and arranging for innovative problem-solving efforts when problems
318
arise.
3. Making Earned Release Compatible with Public Safety
Since earned release measures increase the number of offenders in
the community, policymakers in all states need to ensure that earned
release does not endanger public safety. There are three chief methods
for accomplishing this aim. First, states could apply earned release
mostly to those offenders who have not been convicted of violent
crimes, sexual crimes, or other particularly serious crimes. Second,
states should use an empirically validated risk assessment tool for
making individual release decisions, though without relying on it
excessively. Third, policymakers should devote additional resources to
317. See Norris, supra note 293, at 305 (noting the importance of staff members in
activating and administering innovative governance programs).
318. See Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Learning from Difference: The New
Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU, 14 EUR. L.J. 271, 276 (2008)
(emphasizing the role of regular monitoring and comparison across units in enhancing
accountability in contemporary forms of governance).
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community supervision, reentry programs, and other measures intended
to reduce recidivism among those released. These strategies are
important for the political survival of earned release, which is vulnerable
to public relations problems if releasees commit new offenses.
First, earned release mechanisms should favor offenders who are less
likely than others to reoffend, and perhaps focus on non-violent
offenders. As noted above, many of Wisconsin’s earned release
mechanisms that were passed in 2009 but abolished in 2011 applied only
to non-violent offenders, and those that did apply to violent offenders
319
required these inmates to serve a larger portion of their sentences.
States can select a variety of policy options, such as banning earned
release for all violent felons, varying the percentage of the sentence the
inmate must serve depending on the offense classification, and
increasing the number of actors with veto power over the release of
more serious offenders.
It is a legitimate question whether the violent–nonviolent distinction
is empirically valid as a predictor of recidivism, as opposed to a strategy
for making earned release politically palatable. It may be true that
certain violent offenders are no more likely than nonviolent offenders to
commit additional offenses—for example, someone who murders a
320
spouse might be at lower risk for recidivism than a burglar. Even if
the violent–nonviolent distinction lacks hard empirical backing, it may
be justified because of the greater value society places on life as opposed
to property. That is, even if particular violent offenders may be less
likely to commit additional crimes, the risk such offenders pose to life
and limb, however small, may justify erring on the side of caution.
Ideally, however, earned release policies would only restrict eligibility
based on empirically valid criteria.
States should also adopt scientifically valid risk assessment
instruments, though without relying excessively on them. Wisconsin’s
old instrument was developed in the 1980s, and suffered from numerous
321
methodological flaws. Fortunately, resources are available to states to
help reform these instruments. As described earlier, the Justice Center

319. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
320. See Klingele, Early Demise, supra note 9, at 450–52 (discussing evidence that some
non-violent offenders have higher rates of recidivism, and arguing against categorically
excluding violent offenders from earned release).
321. EISENBERG ET AL., supra note 194, at iii–iv; see supra note 189 and accompanying
text.
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performed a thorough analysis of Wisconsin’s risk assessment
procedure, which resulted in the much improved assessment tool now in
322
While risk assessment instruments are useful, decision-makers
use.
need to recognize their limitations and avoid making decisions based
solely on the instruments, instead of evaluating all the relevant facts. In
particular, as stressed recently by Professor Harcourt, policymakers
should ensure that risk assessment does not unfairly disadvantage
323
minorities.
Finally, policymakers in all states should accompany earned release
legislation with measures shown to reduce recidivism among those
released. Among these measures could be increased resources for
community supervision; intensive supervision programs; offender
reentry initiatives; increased rehabilitative and mental health services;
and job training and placement programs, including programs directed
specifically toward those who have achieved earned release. Resources
directed toward generally improving conditions in the areas where most
offenders reside, as the Justice Center advocates, is also a worthwhile
324
As discussed
strategy for reducing recidivism and crime in general.
previously, Wisconsin established a Council on Offender Reentry, and
directed the DOC to establish services to reduce recidivism among those
325
However, without
serving community supervision sentences.
additional resources and coordinated efforts at implementation, such
measures may be limited in their impact.
4. Complementing Earned Release with Additional Measures to
Reduce Incarceration
States must recognize that new earned release legislation in isolation
may do relatively little to decrease correctional costs. A lack of
necessary programs, judicial vetoes, hesitant or understaffed state
agencies, delays in developing the procedures needed for
implementation, or other factors could easily result in only a small
trickle of earned releases. In Wisconsin, for example, despite the
creation of multiple new forms of earned release, only 666 inmates were
released through them, and most of them were already going to be

322.
323.
324.
325.

Interview with Anthony Streveler, supra note 185.
See Harcourt, supra note 12 (manuscript at 2, 8–9).
See supra notes 258–259 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.A.

20 - NORRIS (DO NOT DELETE)

1624

7/10/2012 9:19 AM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[95:1551

released in the same year.326
In 2010, the first full year of
implementation for the measures passed in 2009, only 107 of the earned
releases (corresponding to about .5% of the prison population) would
327
not have occurred sometime that year anyway.
Because earned release in many cases may do relatively little to
decrease incarceration, states should engage in several parallel strategies
to reduce prison populations, doing their best to integrate and ensure
the consistency of the measures. Importantly, these complementary
strategies to reduce incarceration may be more sustainable than earned
release, which is vulnerable to backlash from the public and political
328
opponents. Indeed, Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker campaigned on
a promise to end earned release, but says he plans to reduce prison
329
admissions to keep corrections spending in check.
These complementary strategies may also be more effective in
330
Studies demonstrate that
reducing the overall prison population.
increases in prison admissions, not the length of sentences, were
overwhelmingly the main cause behind the growing incarceration rates
331
of the 1990s. In Wisconsin, it seems clear that the vast majority of the
overall drop in Wisconsin’s prison population was caused by policies
other than earned release. In particular, a broad range of diversion
programs providing alternatives to incarceration was effective in

326. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
327. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
328. See supra Part II.A.
329. The current secretary of the Department of Corrections says that he and the
Governor will “continue to implement innovative strategies to hold prison populations down
while keeping our communities safe,” mentioning flexible sentencing, community-based
programs, and re-entry initiatives. Hall, supra note 17.
330. The likelihood of opposition to earned release has caused some state lawmakers to
avoid earned release proposals, focusing on other criminal justice reforms instead. An Idaho
official said that “the measures the state’s already taking—problem-solving courts, developing
alternatives to incarceration, treatment programs, and a ‘violation matrix’—offer better hope
of results. We have really seen a significant reduction, . . . [and we’re a thousand inmates
below where we thought we’d be in 2008.” Betsy Z. Russell, Eye on Boise: Prisons: Spending
Less Now . . ., SPOKESMAN-REVIEW (Boise, Idaho) (Feb. 5, 2010, 8:36 AM), http://www.
spokesman.com/blogs/boise/2010/feb/05/prisons-spending-less-now/ (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Idaho Corrections Director Brent Reinke).
331. John F. Pfaff, The Causes of Growth in Prison Admissions and Population 37–38
(Working Paper 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=19905
08 (presenting research demonstrating that “(1) prison admissions, rather than time served,
have been the primary driver of prison growth, and that (2) at least since the late 1980s, the
main force behind rising admissions has been rising felony filings (and filings per arrest)”).
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reducing prison admissions, along with re-entry programs, additional
332
drug treatment, and efforts to reduce revocation rates.
A variety of strategies are available to reduce the prison population.
Among them are (a) systematic efforts to reduce revocations from
probation, parole, or extended supervision; (b) reentry programs aimed
at preventing recidivism; (c) additional resources or statutory authority
for prison diversion programs such as drug courts; (d) reducing statutory
penalties or adjusting sentencing guidelines downward for certain
nonviolent offenses; and (e) prosecutors and judges using their
discretion to seek probation and treatment rather than incarceration for
drug-related crimes and other minor offenses. As a detailed discussion
of these options is beyond the scope of the Article, this Part reviews
each of them only briefly.
Strategies for reducing the revocation rate of offenders serving
community supervision sentences, along with limitations on the
sentences judges can impose after revocation, are among the most
promising methods of reducing incarceration. In many areas, revocation
rates are extremely high, and offenders revoked for technical offenses
333
Some
often account for a large proportion of new prison inmates.
states have succeeded in dramatically reducing revocation rates,
334
Restrictions on post-revocation
resulting in significant savings.
sentencing may also be effective in reducing prison populations. A
measure preventing judges from sentencing offenders after revocation
for more than six months of incarceration passed the Wisconsin
335
legislature, only to be vetoed by Governor Jim Doyle. Several states
already place similar restrictions on the incarceration of offenders
336
serving community supervision sentences.

332. E-mail from Anthony Streveler, supra note 104.
333. See supra note 209 and accompanying text; see also Clear & Schrantz, supra note 1,
at 141S (noting that for states with high rates of technical revocations, reducing these
revocations can be an important strategy for reducing prison population).
334. Cindy Horswell, Texas Cuts Costs Amid Prison Reform: New Treatment Programs
Credited as Prison Population Slows, CHRON.COM (Dec. 15, 2009), http://www.chron.
com/news/houston-texas/article/Treatment-efforts-credited-as-prison-population-1750304.php
(“The state reports a dramatic 25 percent drop in parole violators being returned to prison
while the number of those being paroled has increased by 3 percent.”); Adam Serwer, When
Slim Budgets Mean Better Prisons, AMER. PROSPECT (Mar. 18, 2009),
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=when_slim_budgets_mean_better_prisons (noting
that Justice Center-supported reforms in Kansas led to a 48% decrease in revocations).
335. 2009 WI Act 28, § 2726 (renumbering and amending WIS. STAT. § 302.113(9)).
336. ALISON LAWRENCE, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGS., PROBATION AND
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Reentry programs also show promise as a strategy to reduce
incarceration. The federal Second Chance Act of 2007 provided federal
funds to states for programs aimed at promoting the integration of
337
Over 100
offenders into communities and thus reducing recidivism.
338
million dollars in grants were available for the 2010 fiscal year. More
than just a funding phenomenon, interest in reentry policy around the
country has reached such a level that observers now commonly speak of
339
The movement appears to have spawned a
a “reentry movement.”
340
number of effective approaches for reducing recidivism. States hoping
to reduce corrections spending would benefit from investing state
resources in reentry efforts, in addition to pursuing federal grants. As
noted above, Wisconsin has established a Council on Offender Reentry
to coordinate and study reentry programs, though it is too early to
341
evaluate its progress.
Diversion programs, which divert inmates to treatment and noncustodial sanctions instead of incarceration, are another very useful tool
for decreasing prison populations. Evaluations of diversion programs
have shown that they can reduce incarceration without increasing public
342
safety risks. Specialized courts such as drug courts, which function as
diversion programs, have also succeeded in reducing incarceration and
343
However, caution must be exercised to ensure that the
recidivism.
programs do not simply “widen the net” by prosecuting those who

PAROLE
VIOLATIONS:
STATE
RESPONSES
4–5
(2008),
available
at
http://www.ncsl.org/print/cj/violationsreport.pdf.
337. Michael M. O’Hear, The Second Chance Act and the Future of Reentry Reform, 20
FED. SENT’G REP. 75, 75–76 (2007) [hereinafter O’Hear, Second Chance]; Second Chance
Act, NATIONAL RE-ENTRY RESOURCE CENTER, http://www.nationalreentryresourcecenter
.org/about/second-chance-act (last visited June 1, 2012).
338. O’Hear, Second Chance, supra note 337, at 76.
339. See, e.g., Jeremy Travis, Reflections on the Reentry Movement, 20 FED. SENT’G REP.
84, 84–85 (2007).
340. Id.
341. See supra Part III.A.4.
342. Henry J. Steadman & Michelle Naples, Assessing the Effectiveness of Jail Diversion
Programs for Persons with Serious Mental Illness and Co-Occurring Substance Use Disorders,
23 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 163, 168–70 (2005).
343. See C. WEST HUDDLESTON, III, ET AL., NAT’L DRUG CT. INST., PAINTING THE
CURRENT PICTURE: A NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON DRUG COURTS AND OTHER
PROBLEM-SOLVING COURT PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 6–8 (2008), available at
http://www.ndci.org/sites/default/files/ndci/PCPII1_web%5B1%5D.pdf
(summarizing
research on drug court effectiveness).
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would previously have been ignored (or treated leniently) by the
344
criminal justice system.
Reducing criminal penalties and lowering sentencing guidelines for
particular offenses may also be effective means of reducing
incarceration without endangering the public. These measures could
range from making possession of small amounts of marijuana or other
drugs punishable only by a fine to lowering the maximum penalties for
other nonviolent offenses and victimless crimes. Several cities and
states have recently decriminalized or are currently considering
decriminalizing marijuana, often motivated by the potential budgetary
345
Repealing harsh sentencing laws, such as three-strikes
savings.
provisions and mandatory minimum sentences, could lead to significant
savings in a number of states. In fact, several states have recently
346
repealed mandatory minimum sentences.
Even if criminal penalties remain the same, prosecutors and judges
can make a significant difference by acting within their discretion to
344. William G. Meyer & A. William Ritter, Drug Courts Work, 14 FED. SENT’G REP.
179, 180 (2002) (defending drug courts against claims of “net widen[ing],” by noting the
absence of evidence for such an effect).
345. Jim Altman, Bill to Ease Pot Law Penalties Draws Fire, HARTFORD COURANT
(Conn.), Mar. 20, 2010, at B3 (noting aim of decriminalizing marijuana possession is to “save
the state the expense of prosecuting relatively minor drug offenses.”); Tim Johnson, Mexico
Bristles as Some U.S. States Move to Relax Marijuana Laws, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.),
Mar. 26, 2010, at 9 (discussing impact on Mexico of U.S. states decriminalizing small amounts
of marijuana possession); Terry Date, Testimony Heard on Marijuana Bill: Legislation Would
Decriminalize Small Amounts, EAGLE-TRIB. (N. Andover, Mass.) (Apr. 7, 2010),
http://www.eagletribune.com/newhampshire/x908930224/Testimony-heard-on-marijuana-bill
(awaiting recommendation from committee on bill that would decriminalize marijuana
possession of a quarter-ounce or less); Norma Love, NH House Approves Decriminalizing
Marijuana, BOSTON.COM (Mar. 10, 2010), http://www.boston.com/news/local/new_hampshire/
articles/2010/03/10/nh_house_considering_decriminalizing_marijuana/; Craig McCoy et al.,
Philadelphia to Ease Marijuana Penalty, PHILA. INQUIRER (Apr. 5, 2010), http://articles.phi
lly.com/2010-04-05/news/24956838_1_marijuana-court-system-possession-of-small-amounts
(discussing new policy of fining marijuana possession of less than thirty grams rather than add
to criminal record); William M. Welchand & Donna Leinwand, Slowly, States Are Lessening
Limits on Marijuana, USATODAY.COM (Mar. 9, 2010), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation
/2010-03-08-marijuana_N.htm.
346. Jeremy Peters, Albany Reaches Deal to Repeal ‘70s Drug Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
26, 2009, at A1; see also Families Against Mandatory Minimums, State Responses to
Mandatory
Minimum
Laws,
FAMILIES
AGAINST
MANDATORY MINIMUMS (Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.famm.org/Repository/Files/State%20R
esponses%20to%20Mandatory%20Minimum%20Laws%20Alphabetically%20_2-23-10_%5
B1%5D.pdf (describing how Rhode Island, Michigan, New Mexico, Indiana, Louisiana,
Mississippi, and North Dakota have eliminated certain mandatory minimum sentencing
statutes).
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favor treatment, community supervision, and other programs over
incarceration. Arguably, the most crucial step in both reducing prison
populations and diminishing the deep racial disparities in the criminal
justice system is to drastically scale back the War on Drugs, focusing on
treatment rather than punishment. This would mean refraining in most
cases from sentencing drug offenders to incarceration unless they have
committed other non-drug offenses that clearly indicate that
incarceration is needed to protect the public. After all, whites and
blacks use illegal drugs at the same rates, yet African-Americans are
many times more likely to be stopped, searched, arrested, charged,
347
In some states,
convicted, and sentenced to prison for drug crimes.
blacks are from twenty to fifty times more likely to be incarcerated for
348
In general, policy changes meant to reduce racial
drug offenses.
disparities should usually serve to decrease prison populations (that is,
unless they move toward parity by imprisoning more whites).
These complementary strategies are important for states to consider
in tandem with earned release reforms, in part because they may be
more sustainable, even in the short term. Indeed, earned release plans
349
in some states have been discontinued shortly after their inception.
Most of these other strategies are unlikely to cause controversy, since,
for example, few are likely to complain about a drop in the rate of
revocations for technical violations of parole. Moreover, because these
strategies all operate to reduce incarceration at the front end, they are
likely to be more effective than earned release in reducing incarceration
levels and corrections costs.
Wisconsin’s recent history bears this out. The vast majority of the
recent drop in Wisconsin’s prison population was due to diversion
350
programs and other reforms, not earned release. Likewise, among the
state’s various criminal justice reforms, only earned release attracted
351
Indeed, as mentioned above, Governor
significant controversy.
Walker largely repealed earned release, but he has also stated that he
347. See ALEXANDER, supra note 38, at 7; see also supra note 38 (addressing racial
disparities in the criminal justice system).
348. Id.
349. See supra Part II.A; Klingele, Early Demise, supra note 9, at 432–35.
350. See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
351. However, other reforms were not completely immune from criticism: a scathing
news report uncovered glaring flaws of one Milwaukee diversion program. Ben Poston &
Daniel Bice, Some Cases in Deferred Prosecution Process Raise Eyebrows, JSONLINE (Dec.
12, 2010), http://www.jsonline.com/watchdog/watchdogreports/111733029.html.
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supports efforts to lower correction costs by lowering prison
352
admissions.
C. Implications for Rule-of-Law Sentencing
One advantage of this four-pronged approach to earned release
reforms is that it could help achieve the elusive goal of bringing the rule
of law to sentencing. As Judge Marvin Frankel observed, sentencing
353
has long been characterized by the absence of law. This can result in
arbitrary decisions unguided by a legal standard, and wide disparities
among similar offenders. Popular approaches to narrow sentencing
discretion, particularly sentencing guidelines, have been overly
formulaic, giving undue attention to two factors only: the offense
354
Professors Michael
category and the number of previous offenses.
Smith and Walter Dickey of the University of Wisconsin Law School
have proposed the “rule-of-law sentencing” model, which is highly
355
promising but has not yet been achieved in practice.
This model, described in more detail above in Part III.B.1, is a
compelling approach to bringing a legal reasoning process to judicial
sentencing decisions. Yet it remains unclear how rule-of-law sentencing
might be implemented. Proponents of rule-of-law sentencing may have
presumed originally that a comprehensive statute or common law
doctrine imposed from above could, if enforced by appellate courts,
cause rule-of-law sentencing to gain hold among trial court judges.
However, even though the Wisconsin Supreme Court decision in State v.
Gallion conforms rather closely to the ideas of rule-of-law sentencing,
appellate courts have declined to reverse inadequately reasoned
356
sentences, and the impact of the ruling on sentencing is unclear.
This Article suggests an alternative model for the diffusion of ruleof-law sentencing, based on two main mechanisms.
First, the
administrative officials making earned release decisions—which are
after all a form of sentencing decision—should be required to record
their reasoning process with reference to sentencing objectives, relevant
facts, and elements of the sentence. Ideally, community supervision

352. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
353. See Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1972)
(reprinting the 1971 lecture); see also FRANKEL, supra note 282, at 7.
354. See Smith & Dickey, supra note 30, at 5.
355. See id.
356. See Norris, supra note 60.
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agents would also engage in a similar reasoning process when deciding
how to enforce conditions of parole, including whether to recommend
revocation, since these decisions are in effect sentencing decisions as
well. By expanding the structured, recorded exercise of discretion from
judges to other government actors involved in sentencing-related
decisions, this approach would bring the rule of law to the
administrative state, enhancing both procedural justice and the quality
of decision-making.
Second, judges should be encouraged to become actively involved in
every aspect of criminal justice reform. This could enhance rule-of-law
sentencing by (a) increasing their knowledge of what sentencing options
are already available and what programs have been shown to be most
effective; (b) disseminating knowledge about innovative sentencing
practices such as new kinds of courts or diversion programs; (c)
increasing judges’ awareness of general issues in criminal justice reform,
such as the factors driving racial disparities and the growing movement
to sentence lower-level offenders to treatment and supervision rather
than prison; and (d) fostering a dialogue among judges about the proper
357
If more judges became involved and
use of sentencing discretion.
these four results occurred, this could foster the development of rule-oflaw sentencing norms in a bottom-up fashion. Such a development may
be more productive than relying on legal doctrines like Gallion to
change sentencing practices.
Increasing the participation of judges may also improve the
governance of criminal justice reforms by taking into account the
judicial role and individual judges’ perspectives, in these reforms.
Indeed, a review of local criminal justice policy councils indicated that

357. The most difficult aspect of bringing the rule of law to sentencing is arguably the
task of giving judges the information they need to determine what punishment will achieve
public safety. This is because judges rarely have access to rich information about which
programs are available in prison and in the community, their effectiveness, and the existence
of social supports in the offender’s community. In the absence of realistic information about
the usefulness of their sentencing options, judges’ fact-finding at sentencing is often mainly
confined to noting mitigating and aggravating factors. Without data on recidivism, judges are
unlikely to know whether intensive community sanctions, another prison diversion program,
or a prison term is more likely to protect public safety. Judges in such situations might
understandably err on the side of incarceration because of its temporary incapacitation effect,
even when noncustodial sanctions may be more effective in the long term. Widespread
judicial involvement in criminal justice reforms may enhance judge’s knowledge of these
matters, improving their ability to impose sentences that best accomplish the objectives of the
sentence.
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the presence and especially leadership of a judge was often the main
358
factor behind the success of the council. Encouragingly, the Wisconsin
legislation mandating the creation of a Council on Offender Reentry
359
specifically requires a judge or former judge to serve on the council.
More generally, Professors Cecelia Klingele, Michael Scott, and Walter
Dickey have argued compellingly that “reimagining criminal justice”
should involve “judges as organizers” who take an “active role in
360
problem-solving.”
Indeed, each criminal justice reform—whether it is the creation of
reentry policy councils, the introduction of new earned release
mechanisms, the use of alternative courts like drug courts, or
experimentation with intensive community sanctions—presents a
myriad of needs for judicial education and opportunities for judicial
involvement. By integrating judges into sentencing policy and by having
non-judicial sentencing decision-makers abide by reasoning
requirements similar to those required of judges, the rule-of-law
sentencing approach may take root in a sustainable way.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article uses the example of Wisconsin and recent scholarship to
develop general lessons for other states with earned released policies.
Wisconsin’s 2009 earned release legislation had several positive
elements, including a decrease in the judicial role, a widening of
compassionate release, special attention to protecting public safety, and
initiatives to reduce recidivism and revocations from community
supervision sentences.
It suffered, however, from uneven
implementation and excessive complexity, and never had the additional
resources that were probably needed for full implementation (with the
exception of new funding for community corrections).
Drawing on Wisconsin’s example and recent criminal justice and
governance scholarship, this Article outlines four principles for states to

358. See RICHARD P. STOKER, STATE JUSTICE INST. CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE PUB.
POLICY, FIVE REASONS WHY JUDGES SHOULD BECOME MORE INVOLVED IN
ESTABLISHING, LEADING, AND PARTICIPATING ON COLLABORATIVE, POLICY-FOCUSED
TEAMS 2–6 (2006), available at http://www.wicourts.gov/about/organization/programs/docs/
judgerolereport.pdf.
359. WIS. STAT. § 15.145(5) (2009–2010).
360. Cecelia Klingele et al., Reimagining Criminal Justice, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 953, 982–85
(2010).
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use in ensuring the success of earned release legislation. These include
provisions for preventing injustice through transparent monitoring and
structured decision-making, ensuring implementation through strategic
governance, making earned release compatible with public safety, and
complementing earned release with other, perhaps more effective and
sustainable, methods of reducing prison populations and correctional
costs. Along with increasing the effectiveness of earned release policies,
these principles may help achieve the goal of bringing the rule of law to
the sentencing process.
The Article also provides some preliminary empirical responses to
pressing questions about earned release. First, in support of the
argument that administrators, rather than judges, should be the main
actors behind earned release, I present data showing wide geographic
disparities in the approval rates under the judicial sentence adjustment
mechanism, which may have reinforced the state’s racial disparities.
Second, responding to concerns that using risk assessment tools to
inform earned release decisions would exacerbate racial disparities, this
Article shows that this did not occur in Wisconsin’s expanded earned
release mechanisms in effect from 2009 to 2011. Third, supporting
claims that earned release may have a relatively small role to play in
reducing the prison population, I show that even Wisconsin’s numerous
new earned release mechanisms had little impact on the state’s prison
population.
Earned release policy is a high-stakes game, with potentially vast
consequences. Unwisely implemented measures could cause backlashes
that prevent policymakers from breaking out of the tough-on-crime
paradigm of the 1990s, reinforcing the escalating prison costs and overincarceration the paradigm brought about. Well-executed reforms, in
contrast, could help bring about a new sentencing era, characterized by
less imprisonment and enhanced public safety. This Article’s proposed
principles for successfully planning and implementing earned release
reforms are intended both to serve as a tentative guide for states, and to
encourage a dialogue among academics and practitioners about best
practices in this area of criminal justice reform.
Further research on this topic should systematically assess how the
earned release revolution has fared in other states. Have some states
succeeded in releasing significant numbers of inmates without causing
public safety problems? Has decreasing prison admissions been a more
successful strategy reducing prison populations? Has earned release
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worsened or improved racial disparities in any states? Research
answering these questions could potentially test the four principles
advocated in this article, determining whether their use predicts the
success of earned release mechanisms.

